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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING ( SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Een aantal decennia geleden werden verschillende prestatiemeetsystemen (PMSs) ontwikkeld. In 
een mum van tijd integreerden vele ondernemingen zo een prestatiemeetsysteem. Aan de basis van 
deze snelle integratie liggen (1) de oneindige publicaties van succesverhalen, en (2) het geloof dat 
PMSs de winst van de organisaties kunnen verhogen. Desondanks de succesverhalen bleven 
mislukkingen niet uit. Blijkbaar ging men iets te kort door de bocht door te veronderstellen dat PMSs 
in gelijk welke situatie lucratief zouden zijn voor de ondernemingen. Om aan de wispelturige 
uitkomst van PMSs tegemoet te komen en de effectiviteit van PMSs te verbeteren, werd het concept 
‘enabling’ geïntroduceerd. Enabling betekent letterlijk ‘in staat stellen’. Een enabling PMS houdt in 
dat werknemers door het PMS in staat worden gesteld om onvermijdelijke onvoorziene 
gebeurtenissen, die zich in hun werksituatie voordoen, aan te pakken. Als de organisatie er in slaagt 
een PMS te ontwikkelen dat enabling is, dan zou het toch het verwachte effect kunnen hebben en 
kunnen leiden tot een stijging van de winst.  
 
Het potentieel van een enabling PMS, gecombineerd met het gebrek aan onderzoek over dit concept, 
leidt tot de focus van de eerste studie in dit doctoraat. Een gevallenstudie in twee Belgische bedrijven 
heeft het mogelijk gemaakt om de condities onder dewelke een PMS als enabling aanzien wordt te 
onderzoeken. Deze studie wees uit dat de variabelen die voorgaand onderzoek reeds aanhaalde om 
een PMS enabling te maken, ontoereikend zijn. Onze studie vond bewijs dat de perceptie van 
managers over het al dan niet enabling zijn van het PMS ook afhangt van de manier waarop de 
managers mogen participeren aan het ontwikkelingsprocess van het PMS. Enkel als de managers 
‘echte’ participatie in plaats van pseudo participatie ervaren, zullen zij het PMS als enabling ervaren.  
 
Nadat de eerste studie aangaf hoe een PMS als enabling kan ervaren worden, onderzochten we het 
concept van een enabling PMS. De tweede studie moet duidelijkheid bieden op de vraag of de 
prestaties van de managers worden beïnvloed door een enabling PMS en hoe deze relatie precies is 
opgebouwd. Om een onderzoeksmodel op de bouwen, steunt deze studie op de psychologische zelf-
determinatie theorie. Deze motivatietheorie is in de jaren ’70 ontwikkeld en stelt dat motivatie is 
opgebouwd uit verschillende types van motivatie. Deze theorie benadrukt het belang van het 
opsplitsen van motivatie in deze verschillende subcategorieën. Indien deze opsplitsing niet gebeurt, 
dan stellen ze dat mogelijke relaties niet zullen gevonden worden en dat onduidelijke verbanden en 
tegenstrijdige uitkomsten zullen blijven bestaan. Bij het onderzoeken van werkmotivatie is het 
onderscheid tussen autonome en gecontroleerde motivatie van uitermate groot belang. Wanneer 
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iemand gecontroleerd gemotiveerd is voor het werk, dan zal die persoon die taken in zijn job 
vervullen om niet ontslaan te worden, om op het einde van het jaar de bonus binnen te halen, om 
zich niet te moeten schamen ten opzichte van vrienden, collega’s en familie. Wanneer iemand 
autonoom gemotiveerd is voor de job, dan zal die persoon werken omdat het werk leuk is of omdat 
die persoon begrijpt dat het voor de onderneming belangrijk is dat de verschillende taken in het 
takenpakket tot een goed einde worden gebracht. Aan de hand van de zelf-determinatie theorie is 
het mogelijk om de relatie tussen enabling PMS en prestaties van de managers, te verklaren. Het 
vooropgestelde model werd via de techniek van ‘structural equation modeling’ getest. Om de nodige 
data te verzamelen werd een vragenlijst uitgestuurd. 186 managers uit verschillende Belgische 
bedrijven stuurden een volledig ingevulde vragenlijst terug. Op basis van deze data konden we onze 
onderzoeksvraag aanpakken. De resultaten van deze studie wijzen uit dat een enabling PMS wel 
degelijk een belangrijk effect heeft op de prestaties van de managers. Dit effect is echter indirect en 
verloopt via de autonome motivatie. Een enabling PMS heeft dus een positieve relatie met 
autonome motivatie en autonome motivatie heeft op zijn beurt een positieve relatie met de 
prestaties van de managers. De bevindingen van de studie illustreren ook dat de gecontroleerde 
motivatie geen significante verklaringskracht heeft in de PMS-prestatie relatie.    
 
Een enabling PMS is dus in staat om de prestaties van de managers positief te beïnvloeden, echter 
het zijn beloningen die aanzien worden als het grootste en effectiefste wapen om de motivatie van 
werknemers te beïnvloeden. Daarom wordt in de derde studie van dit doctoraat onderzocht of 
beloningen een positief effect hebben op autonome motivatie in een omgeving waar een PMS 
gebruikt wordt. Om deze onderzoeksvraag te behandelen, wordt gebruik gemaakt van data vergaard 
door het uitsturen van vragenlijsten. In totaal vulden 314 managers de vragenlijst in. De resultaten 
tonen aan dat ondernemingen baat hebben bij een PMS dat aanzien wordt als enabling. Managers 
die hun PMS als hoog enabling ervaren hebben immers een hogere autonome motivatie dan 
managers die hun PMS als laag enabling ervaren of dan managers die geen PMS hebben. Hieruit 
blijkt nogmaals het belang van het hebben van een PMS en meer in het bijzonder het hebben van 
een hoog enabling PMS. De bevindingen van de studie geven ook aan dat als de manager al een hoog 
enabling PMS heeft, dat dan het hebben van een bonus en meer specifiek het hebben van een 
eerlijke bonus van ondergeschikt belang is. Echter wanneer de manager zijn PMS beschouwt als laag 
enabling, dan merken we dat hoe hoger de eerlijkheid van de bonus, hoe hoger de autonome 
motivatie van de manager blijkt te zijn.  
ix 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
A few decades ago, several performance measurement systems (PMSs) were developed. These 
systems have been rapidly adopted by many organizations. The reason for this fast integration was 
the publication of numerous success stories and a strong belief in the power of these systems to 
increase organizational profit. Although many success stories were revealed, failures were bound to 
follow. To improve the effectiveness of the PMSs the concept of enabling formalization has been 
introduced. An enabling formalization can contribute to the effectiveness of a PMS as it seeks to put 
employees in a position to deal with the inevitable contingencies in their work. 
 
The potential of an enabling PMS, combined with the lack of research on this concept, results in the 
focus of the first study in this dissertation. A case study research in two Belgian companies made it  
possible to investigate the conditions under which a PMS is perceived as enabling. This study 
revealed that the variables detected in previous research to create an enabling PMS are insufficient. 
More specifically, middle managers’ perception of the PMS as an enabling technology is also 
contingent on the mode of participation and their experienced participation congruence during the 
development process. Only when managers have true participation they will perceive the PMS as 
enabling.  
 
After having discovered the possibility of a PMS to be an enabling technology, the second study 
investigated whether and how managerial performance is affected by PMSs designed as an enabling 
technology. To build a research model, the study drew on the self-determination theory and 
described the motivational mechanisms that play a pivotal role in the relationship between a PMS 
and managerial performance. Structural equation modeling on questionnaire data obtained from 186 
managers from different Belgian companies were used to get an indication on the research question. 
The results indicated the significance of an enabling PMS. An enabling PMS impacted performance 
indirectly, and this effect occurred through autonomous motivation. Our findings also demonstrated 
that controlled motivation had no significant explanatory power in the PMS-performance 
relationship.   
 
An enabling PMS can enhance managerial performance, however it are rewards that are seen as the 
organization’s most important motivational arsenal. Therefore, the third study in this dissertation 
investigated whether individual monetary rewards can have an effect on autonomous motivation 
when the organization uses an enabling PMS. This study, which made use of questionnaire data of 
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314 managers, revealed that organizations benefit from PMSs that are perceived to be highly 
enabling. The higher the degree of the enabling PMS, the less effective a fair individual monetary 
bonus was to enhance the level of autonomous motivation. In organizations where the PMS was 
perceived to be minimally enabling, the results indicated that the higher the level of perceived 
fairness of the individual monetary reward, the higher the level of autonomous motivation.   
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CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
A few decades ago, several performance measurement systems (PMSs) were developed. These 
systems have been rapidly adopted by many organizations. The reason for this fast integration is the 
publication of many success stories and the strong belief in the power of the PMS to increase 
organizational profit. Through the combination of financial and non-financial measures in these 
PMSs, organizations can better adapt to their strategy and compete in a dynamic environment. 
Although many success stories were revealed, failures were bound to follow. Consequently, research 
toward the effective development and use of a PMS boomed (e.g.; Bourne, Mills, Wilcox, Neely, & 
Platts, 2000; Bourne, Neely, Platts, & Mills, 2002; Kennerley & Neely, 2002; Neely, 2005; Neely, 
Gregory, & Platts, 2005; Neely et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the absence of a clear and comprehensive 
typology for analyzing more processual uses of management accounting systems makes investigation 
of their effectiveness difficult (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Therefore, the concept of enabling 
formalization has been introduced.  
 
The concept of enabling found its origin in a study by Adler and Borys (1996). Those authors defined 
the concept of enabling in a workflow formalization context. An enabling formalization is one that 
helps committed employees to do their jobs more effectively and reinforce their commitment (Adler 
& Borys, 1996). This typology can be extended beyond workflow formalization (Adler & Borys, 1996).  
In 2004, Ahrens and Chapman translated the concept to a management control system context. 
These authors stated that an enabling use can contribute to the effectiveness as it seeks to put 
employees in a position to deal directly with the inevitable contingencies in their work. In addition, 
the role of an enabling typology to investigate the effectiveness of management control systems is 
stressed (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  
 
The potential of an enabling PMS, combined with the lack of research on this concept, lead to the 
first focus of this dissertation. To meet this deficiency, this research addressed two research paths. 
First, case study research investigated the conditions under which a PMS is perceived as enabling. 
Second, the concept enabling formalization was conceptualized and operationalized. The latter 
delivers the opportunity for future research to compare their findings on enabling PMSs.  
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That PMSs have the power to affect managerial behavior has been known for decades (e.g.; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1992) and was the second focus of this dissertation. Scholars revealed that the real power of 
the PMS is the possibility to control the actions of the middle managers to attain the companies goals 
and consequently realize the organization’s strategy (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). In this view, the 
importance of the PMS to be enabling has been stressed (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Nevertheless, 
there has been little research on the effectiveness of PMSs on the attitudes of middle managers. 
Consequently, the second focus of this dissertation investigated the effect of enabling PMSs on 
middle managers’ motivation and performance. This research answered to the call for research on 
the effect of performance measurement systems on performance (Bourne, Melnyk, & Faull, 2007; 
Bourne, Melnyk, Bititci, Platts, & Andersen, 2014).  
 
The relationship between an enabling PMS and managerial performance was scrutinized. However, 
when investigating managerial performance, it is inevitable to integrate rewards into the analyses. 
Rewards are considered pivotal in an organization’s motivational arsenal (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 
2005). It is impossible to imagine a work environment without rewards. The importance of rewards 
leads to a tremendous amount of literature on rewards. Nevertheless, after decades of research the 
results are still ambiguous (Franco-Santos, Lucianetti, & Bourne, 2012). Studies indicating the positive 
effects of rewards (e.g.; Fang & Gerhart, 2012; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Rynes et al., 2005) are as 
numerous as research revealing negative effects of rewards (e.g.; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Kohn, 1993; 
Sliwka, 2007; Stone, Bryant, & Wier, 2010). The ambiguous findings can be caused by the 
investigation of partial settings (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). Consequently, part of the equivocal results 
can be addressed by integrating information on the presence of a PMS and the degree to which the 
PMS is perceived as enabling. The second study of this dissertation tried to solve the second part of 
the problem and investigated the effect of an enabling PMS on performance. Rewards were 
integrated in the third study of this dissertation. In this part, a profound look into the differences in 
outcome when comparing managers in an organization without PMS and managers in organizations 
using a PMS was integrated.  
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2. DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
As previously noted, this dissertation comprised three interrelated studies. Each study tried to 
elucidate one or two of the research questions and the methods used in each of the studies are 
described below. 
  
Study 1 – The balanced scorecard as an enabling technology: the role of participation. 
The aim of this study was to gain insights into the conditions necessary to create an enabling PMS. 
Previous research indicated the preference for enabling formalization, as this has frequently been 
correlated with positive outcomes (e.g.; Adler & Borys, 1996; Parker, 2003). The effectiveness of an 
enabling PMS has already been suggested (Sundin, Granlund, & Brown, 2010; Wouters, 2009; 
Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Nevertheless, it remains rather unclear 
whether a PMS can be an enabling technology in every situation. Therefore, this study investigated 
the conditions under which a PMS will be enabling. To enable a search toward underlying 
mechanisms and drivers, this study conducted case study research on companies that developed and 
use a balanced scorecard, which is an example of a PMS. The focus on a typical example of a PMS 
makes it possible to rule out findings due to differences within a PMS.   
 
Study 2 – The effect of an enabling performance measurement system on autonomous motivation, 
controlled motivation, and managerial performance.  
The first study examined the possibility of a PMS being an enabling technology. As that study 
discovered that a PMS can be perceived as enabling when there has been true participation during its 
development, the second study investigated whether and how PMSs designed as an enabling 
technology affect managerial performance. To build a research model, the study drew on self-
determination theory and described the motivational mechanisms that play a pivotal role in the 
relationship between a PMS and managerial performance. Path modeling was used to get an 
indication on the research question. As the research on enabling management control systems has 
mainly been performed through case study and longitudinal research (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Cools, Emmanuel, & Jorissen, 2008; Free, 2007; Sundin et al., 2010; Wouters, 2009; Wouters & 
Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008), this study engaged in the development of a scale to 
measure the degree to which a PMS is perceived as an enabling technology. This scale was used to 
test the hypothesized relationships. 
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Study 3 – The effect of an enabling performance measurement system on autonomous motivation: 
the pivotal role of individual monetary rewards.  
The roots for the third study were found in the second study. The second study revealed that an 
enabling PMS enhances autonomous motivation, and subsequently managerial performance. The 
question one should ask is "What is the additional power of rewards?". Rewards are considered 
pivotal in an organization’s motivational arsenal (Rynes et al., 2005). However, further research on 
the effect of monetary rewards in combination with PMSs is recommended (Franco-Santos et al., 
2012). Therefore, the aim of the third study was to investigate whether rewards can have an effect 
on managerial outcomes, and more specifically autonomous motivation, when the organization has 
an enabling PMS. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains the first study that 
investigated the conditions under which the PMS will be perceived as an enabling technology. 
Chapter 3 presents the second study that indicated the effect an enabling PMS has on autonomous 
motivation, controlled motivation and managerial performance. Chapter 4 details the third study 
that determined whether individual monetary rewards are useful in situations where a PMS has 
already been introduced. Finally, chapter 5 elaborates on the main findings, limitations, 
opportunities for future research and the academic and practical contributions of this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2 - THE BALANCED SCORECARD AS AN ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION
*
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores the conditions under which the balanced scorecard (BSC) is perceived as an 
enabling technology. Drawing on the literature on enabling formalization and the development of 
performance measurement systems we posit that the balanced scorecard can be designed as an 
enabling technology characterized by repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and 
flexibility. However, based on field interviews in two Belgian companies, we find that middle 
managers’ perception of the balanced scorecard as enabling is contingent on the way middle 
managers participate during the BSC development process. We find that middle managers perceive 
the balanced scorecard as enabling only when given sufficient opportunity for true participation 
during the development process. Hence, developing a balanced scorecard as an enabling technology 
is more than just a matter of having the necessary features that enhance the enabling nature of a 
BSC.  
 
 
Keywords: balanced scorecard; performance measurement systems; participation; enabling 
formalization; case study 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous literature has revealed that the effectiveness of a performance measurement system (PMS) 
depends on the way the system is developed and used. In an attempt to identify the important 
process variables affecting PMS effectiveness, recent studies have used the concept of enabling 
formalization as a theoretical underpinning (Sundin, Granlund, & Brown, 2010; Wouters, 2009; 
Wouters & Sportel, 2005; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). The concept of enabling (and coercive) 
formalization has been developed by Adler and Borys (1996). These authors used the terms enabling 
and coercive formalization to describe work processes. In addition to the context of work processes, 
these terms can be transmitted into many domains (Adler & Borys, 1996).  
 
In the management accounting context, Ahrens and Chapman (2004) suggested using the framework 
of enabling and coercive formalization when evaluating the effectiveness of management control 
systems. Most research interest has been devoted to enabling formalization. The preference for 
enabling formalization ensued from positive research results (e.g., Adler & Borys, 1996; Parker, 
2003). Consequently, scholars have applied enabling formalization to gain insights into issues related 
to management control systems (e.g., Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). The conducted studies covered 
several subdomains, such as transfer pricing (Cools, Emmanuel, & Jorissen, 2008), budget systems 
(Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011), self-managed work teams (Proenca, 2010), supply 
chain management (Free, 2007), and PMS (Sundin et al., 2010; Wouters, 2009; Wouters & Roijmans, 
2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Research on enabling formalization in a PMS context, delivered 
interesting insights in the use of a PMS (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Sundin et al., 2010), the use of 
multiple objectives in the PMS design (Sundin et al., 2010), the development of a PMS (Wouters, 
2009; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008), and knowledge integration (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). As a 
result, previous research has already identified the necessary characteristics to make a PMS enabling 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2004) and to stimulate its enabling nature during the development process 
(Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In addition, the literature has indicated that an enabling formalization 
can contribute to the motivation and performance of managers (Adler & Borys, 1996; Wouters & 
Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Although interesting insights have been obtained, 
Wouters (2009) calls to perform research on the conditions under which a developmental PMS 
approach is most feasible and effective.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the conditions under which a PMS is perceived as an enabling 
technology. The paper extends the previous literature on the development of a PMS and adds to 
previous research, complementing the characteristics of PMS development (Wouters, 2009; Wouters 
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& Wilderom, 2008). To achieve this aim an exploratory case study of two Belgian companies, in which 
a balanced scorecard (BSC) has been introduced, has been conducted. Both companies implemented 
the BSC using the same developmental process. In one company the BSC has been perceived as an 
enabling technology by most of the middle managers. In the other organization, only a limited 
number of middle managers perceived the BSC as an enabling technology. To reveal the conditions 
determining the effectiveness of the BSC development process, insights from interviews with 19 
middle managers in the two firms are used. The results suggest that participation plays a pivotal role 
in the perception of the BSC as an enabling technology. Only if the middle manager perceives true 
participation (in contrast to pseudo-participation) the BSC will be perceived as an enabling 
technology.  
 
The present study contributes to the research about an enabling PMS in two ways. The findings of 
this study provide a partial clarification of the different outcomes of the perception of the BSC as an 
enabling technology. Moreover, the findings suggest other possible drivers that need to be taken into 
consideration when investigating the pivotal conditions under which a BSC will be perceived as an 
enabling technology.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the conceptual framework of this study is 
outlined. Second, the exploratory case study is described. Third, the results of the case study are 
presented and discussed. Fourth, the implications of the results, limitations of the case study, and 
directions for future research are discussed.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Adler and Borys (1996) distinguished two different types of formalization that could determine work 
processes: enabling and coercive formalization. Work processes formalized in a coercive manner 
make the employees feel forced to perform certain tasks. In contrast, an enabling formalization 
attempts to provide information to make it possible for employees to deal with tasks more 
effectively (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
 
Formalization can help firms channel their focus and adapt more effectively to their environment 
(Patel, 2011). Nevertheless, previous research has indicated that not all types of formalization have 
the same effect on performance or other outcome variables. The types of formalization that are 
perceived as beneficial are those that enable employees to master their tasks (Hempel, Zhang, & 
Han, 2012). The literature indicates that an enabling formalization can positively affect employees’ 
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outcomes (Parker 2003). For example, Adler and Borys (1996) found that an enabling formalization 
can positively affect motivation. Enabling formalization has also been found to make employees feel 
supported and motivated by the rules and systems in place (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). A higher 
degree of motivation will lead to higher effort, performance, and well-being (e.g., Baard, Deci, & 
Ryan, 2004; Gagné & Forester, 2008; Miserandino, 1996). In comparison with coercive formalization, 
enabling formalization empowers employees to better perform their tasks (Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008). Consequently, the enabling formalization is promising for improving personnel and 
organizational performance. As a result, scholars may have to redirect their attention from coercive 
toward enabling types of formalization (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006).  
 
The enabling type of formalization has received much attention as scholars believe in its potential. 
Previous literature has indicated possibilities to expand the enabling formalization concept to a wider 
domain than work processes (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004) and to use the concept 
of enabling formalization to explain accounting-context-related findings. Consequently, the concept 
that had originally been developed to manage work processes got translated to give indication on 
management accounting related topics.  
Research on budgets (Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011), teamwork (González-Romá, 
Fortes Ferreira, & Peiró, 2009), transfer pricing (Cools et al., 2008), supply chain practices (Free, 
2007), and performance measurement systems (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008) using the enabling framework has been executed. When translating the concept of enabling 
formalization to a management control system context, Ahrens and Chapman (2004) used the 
original four features of the Adler and Borys’ framework. We follow their line of reasoning to further 
translate the concept to a more specific type of PMS, namely the BSC.  
 
When looking closely at the concept of enabling formalization and its translation toward 
management accounting system concepts and, more specifically, the BSC, it should be noted that 
Adler and Borys (1996) state that four general features relate to enabling formalization: internal 
transparency, repair, flexibility, and global transparency. When developing enabling formalization, 
Adler and Borys (1996) took work processes to explain the concepts. When work processes exhibit 
these four features, the work processes are enabling (Adler & Borys, 1996). According to the 
definition of Adler and Borys (1996), internal transparency in an enabling formalization means that 
users need both an understanding of the logic of the equipment's internal functioning and 
information on the equipment's status. In an enabling formalization, repair generates procedures 
that facilitate responses to real work contingencies. Breakdowns and repairs identify problems with 
formal procedures, which become opportunities for improvement. Flexibility holds that machines are 
11 
 
programmed to give advice and make suggestions, but it is the responsibility of the user to make 
controlling decisions after the system displays the requisite data. Finally, global transparency refers 
to technologies that are programmed to provide operators with extensive information relating to the 
status of the broader production process.  
 
Following the previous line of research, it would be beneficial to develop a BSC that is perceived as 
an enabling technology. To reach this goal, the BSC must be developed in such a way that it will 
contribute to the four features of an enabling formalization. Consequently, it is important to discuss 
how the four features of an enabling technology could be addressed in a BSC context.  
First, to fulfil the internal transparency feature, an understanding of the logistics of local processes is 
required (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). The implementation of the BSC should accompany 
management from the early design stages of development, using and refining the strategy of the 
organization (De Geuser, Mooray, & Oyon, 2009). The BSC, as described by Kaplan and Norton 
(1992), is characterized by its four perspectives and a strategy link. As a result, managers can be 
given a clear view of the system, allowing them to understand the internal functioning of the BSC. 
Moreover, they gain insight into the performance indicators of the BSC as they have been developed 
from the different perspectives. The strategy map visualizes the processes of linking the different 
perspectives and performance indicators (Kaplan & Norton, 2000), which can contribute to the 
feature of internal transparency.  
Second, repair suggests that processes and shortcomings can be addressed. Users of the system are 
provided with the capabilities to fix problems (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Kaplan and Norton (2000) 
state that strategy maps, which are an essential part of the BSC approach (Speckbacher, Bischof, & 
Pfeiffer, 2003), make it possible to detect major gaps in strategy and empower executives to take 
early corrective actions. In addition, the BSC can enable companies to modify strategies when 
necessary (Kaplan & Norton, 1996).  
Third, flexibility refers to the degree to which people have autonomy in the system (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004). The managers should be actively involved in the process for the effective 
development and application of the BSC (e.g., Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006). Kaplan and Norton 
(1996) state that the development of a BSC is an iterative process in which each step delivers 
incremental improvement. In addition, the BSC provides a framework that allows changes over time.  
Fourth, global transparency provides insight into the structure of the organization and indicates how 
the local processes fit into the organization as a whole (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 
2004). The BSC can help employees understand strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2000) and comprehend 
how business units, departments and processes are aligned with the organization as a whole (Kaplan 
& Norton, 1996); it can also be used to manage interdependencies (Lillis, 2002) and to help 
12 
 
communicate objectives to the people who need to perform the work (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 
Speckbacher et al., 2003). As a consequence, the BSC gives a clear view on how employees’ tasks fit 
into the whole.  
 
This overview of how the BSC can include the four features (necessary to create an enabling 
technology), provides guidance for the developmental phase. The way in which the system has been 
developed is of major importance (Otley, 1999). Scholars have investigated the triggers to determine 
a good developmental process of PMSs (e.g., Bourne, Mills, Wilcox, Neely, & Platts, 2000; Bourne, 
Neely, Platts, & Mills, 2002; Kennerley & Neely, 2002, 2003). Previous research on the PMS as an 
enabling technology has focused on determinants influencing the development process (Wouters, 
2009; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). These studies have delivered insights 
into the variables driving the developmental process. In particular, a process in which managers can 
experiment with the performance measures is needed to enhance the enabling nature of a PMS 
(Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). The development process also needs to be based on experience and 
professionalism to contribute to the enabling nature of the PMS (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). 
Although much is known regarding this developmental process, there is still a need for future 
research on the conditions under which a developmental PMS approach is effective (Wouters, 2009). 
Future research should clarify the antecedents and consequences of this developmental approach for 
the PMSs (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Therefore, this paper will investigate: 
 
Research question: “Under which conditions is a BSC perceived as an enabling technology?” 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
To address the research question, this study draws from two cases in Belgian companies, which 
developed and used the BSC for several years. The focus on conditions that determine the perception 
on the enabling character of the BSC justifies case study research for four reasons. First, case study 
research has a comparative advantage over the survey method when the topic of inquiry has an 
exploratory nature. Previous research shows that not all factors have been found (e.g., Wouters, 
2009; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Case study research provides a unique approach for studying 
PMSs in a real-life context, discovering factors not expected, based on previous research. Second, in 
case study research, researchers can take advantage of flexible data collection if unexpected 
outcomes prove to be interesting (Eisenhardt, 1989). By conducting semi-structured interviews, 
additional insights can be obtained. Third, field-based insights offer the opportunity to further 
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investigate conflicting or ambiguous findings (Lillis & Mundy, 2005). Previous studies on the BSC 
indicated that undiscovered factors may confound the outcome of the perception on a PMS as an 
enabling technology (e.g., Wouters, 2009; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Finally, studying the 
perceptions of the BSC as an enabling PMS, could benefit from direct and in-depth contact with 
middle managers, who experienced the development of a BSC.  
 
In contrast to these advantages, one of the largest challenges case study research must overcome is 
its sensitivity to concerns regarding methodological rigor in terms of validity and reliability (Gibbert, 
Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). However, actions were taken to overcome these concerns.  
 
3.2 CASE STUDY DESIGN 
To address the research question, we investigated companies that developed a company-wide BSC 
following the same development process. This will enable us to detect driving antecedents that 
influence the effectiveness of a BSC. Based on a business contact, we were introduced to a consulting 
firm having several years of experience with the development and implementation of the BSC at 
medium sized and large companies. To increase external validity, we preferred to use several cases 
for this research (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). Therefore the consulting company introduced us to three 
organizations having -what they considered- successful BSC implementations. The consulting firm 
guided the implementation in all three companies following the same developmental approach. Two 
of the three companies were willing to participate in the research. The third company was not 
interested in participating as they were planning to restructure their organization in the short-term. 
 
The two remaining companies are eligible for this case study for three reasons. First, the 
development of the BSC occurred in both companies more than a year before we were introduced. 
As a result, in both companies the development phase was finished.  
Second, the purpose for the introduction of the BSC in both companies was similar. Both companies 
wanted to become more strategy oriented and wanted to motivate managers and employees to 
increase performance. With strategy maps, all tasks at each business level were aligned to the 
strategy.  
Third, as indicated above, both cases hired the same consulting company to guide them through the 
development of the BSC. As a result, both case companies have undergone the same development 
process. The process is split up into different phases. The first phase concerned the corporate level 
and contained multiple workshops. The first workshop was related to strategy. A core team of top-
level managers received training on the concepts of a strategy-focused organization. During 
subsequent workshops, the managers were involved in an intensive dialogue about the challenges in 
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the market environment, formulated the mission and the vision of the division, described the 
strategy using strategy maps, translated the strategy map into a BSC, defined performance targets, 
and planned strategic improvement initiatives. In a second phase, the development process as 
implemented on the corporate level was repeated at the level of each business unit. The core team 
of each business unit defined its mission, vision, and strategy map in accordance with the corporate 
strategy map; linked its key performance indicators to the business unit strategy map, set targets and 
defined improvement actions. 
 
In addition to the development process, the companies’ organizational characteristics are an 
important facet of the case. Therefore, next sub-section will provide information on the 
organizational characteristics of the two companies.  
 
3.3. CASE COMPANY DETAILS 
The first organization in this case is a Belgian industrial company listed on Euronext Brussels. The 
company is internationally active with divisions in three different continents. The organization 
employs approximately 8,000 employees worldwide. However, we only 
investigate the local Belgian manufacturing division of the company, where the BSC was 
implemented by the consulting company. Hence, the Belgian manufacturing division is the subject of 
this case-based research. As a result, it is more important to discuss the characteristics of this 
division than the figures for the firm worldwide. In the Belgian manufacturing division (hereafter case 
A), 2,000 employees are employed. Case A can be seen as a profit center with its own annual report, 
and is located at five different chemical factories spread over the Flemish-speaking part of the 
country. Case A is active in the B2B and B2C market. In Table 1, the profit over turnover ratio has 
been calculated as a measure for financial performance. This ratio is shown for four consecutive 
years, i.e., the year of the BSC development and the three following years. The results of the 
calculation reveal large fluctuations. The interviews were conducted during the second year after 
introducing the BSC. A first revision of the performance measurement system had been planned a 
few months after the interviews took place.  
 
The second case (hereafter case B) is a Belgian semi-government organization. The company employs 
nearly 700 people, who are spread across two sites located in the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium. 
The organization is a manufacturing company active in water supply. This organization operates in 
the B2B and B2C market. The annual report of the company offers the opportunity to calculate profit 
over turnover, which yields information on organization’s financial performance (Table 1). The ratios 
indicate that the organization’s financials did not fluctuate much. In this organization, the BSC was 
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designed and implemented approximately six years before the interviews took place (in 2004 - 2005). 
Two years after the introduction of the BSC, the company began privatization (in 2007). The 
privatization led to a decrease in the profit over turnover ratio. The ratio before the privatization was 
12.45% in 2004, 8.18% in 2005, 10.30% in 2006; however dropped to 4.08% in 2007 due to a 
significant fall in profit. In 2008 the ratio further decreased to 2.97%. The recovery started in 2009 
(4.97%) and continued in 2010 (7.15%). Furthermore, four years after the introduction of the BSC (in 
2009), the organization extended its activities. In addition to supplying potable water, the company 
started to organize the removal of dirty water from them as well. This emerging activity led to the 
implementation of a new business unit. For this business unit, the organization immediately 
repeated the BSC development process to create a BSC for this new business unit. 
 
“Insert Table 1” 
 
3.4. DATA COLLECTION 
Interviews and archival data were collected over a period of 20 months. Through triangulation of 
different sources of data, possible deviations of construct validity were countered (Gibbert & 
Ruigrok, 2010). Within the interview data, three different types of interviews were conducted: 
interviews with middle managers at the two case companies, interviews with a top manager involved 
in the decision to implement the BSC in the company, and interviews with two consultants from the 
consulting firm, who guided the development of the BSC in both companies. All interviews were 
conducted in Dutch in March 2009, May 2009, and February 2010 (Figure 1). The interviews with 
middle managers at both companies were preceded by an interview with a person at a higher level in 
the organization who was involved in the decision to implement the BSC. These people provided 
more information on the structure and culture of the organization and recent events.  
 
“Insert Figure 1” 
 
The archival data include internal documents and website information. We were allowed to see 
slides of the presentations the consulting firm gave in the organizations, providing a clear view of the 
implementation process. In addition, the managers of case B shared their agenda related to the BSC 
with us. As a result, we gain better insight into how the process was conducted and which topics 
were the focus of the different meetings. In both firms, we were allowed to view the resulting BSC 
and the strategy map that had been developed during the different workshops. Table 2 summarizes 
the data.  
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“Insert Table 2” 
 
During semi-structured in-depth interviews, the following open questions were posed: 
- Can you describe the BSC of your department /company?  
- What was the greatest difficulty you encountered during the development of the BSC? 
- How do you experience the BSC in your department /company?  
- What are the BSC’s most valuable characteristics?  
These open questions were followed by more profound questions probing about the four enabling 
characteristics (internal transparency, repair, flexibility, and global transparency). For example to 
learn more about the repair possibilities of the BSC, the following question was posed: “If something 
goes wrong in your department, does the BSC offer some possibilities to react to that?” If so, “How 
does this happen?”. 
 
The interviews took 45 to 114 minutes. We interviewed 19 middle managers, eight of whom were 
employed by case A and 11 of whom were employed by case B. More details on these interviews are 
shown in Table 3. As proposed by Eisenhardt (1989), we stopped interviewing within each of the two 
companies when theoretical saturation was reached. Most interviews were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed in Dutch to improve reliability. Where recording was not possible, 
extensive notes were taken during the interview; shortly after the interview, more detailed notes 
were written down (in Dutch). We thereby created a transparent database, allowing future 
researchers to replicate the research.  
 
“Insert Table 3” 
 
In addition to the interviews in the two companies, we conducted four interviews with two 
employees of the consulting organization (consultant 1 and consultant 2). The first and second 
interviews were conducted with consultant 1 approximately one month before the company 
interviews began (Figure 1). The first interview concerned phases in the development process and 
the background of the companies. These interviews provided deeper insight into the structure and 
culture of the organizations and the design and implementation phases of the BSC. These interviews 
added value because they delivered reliable information on the organization that is less to be biased 
toward socially desirable answers, than the information delivered by the interview with the top 
manager. The third interview (with consultant1) and fourth interview (with consultant 2) were 
conducted after completing the interviews in both companies. During this interview, additional 
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information was gathered about the development process. The focus was on how top management 
implemented various different steps within the organization, rather than the steps themselves.  
 
3.5. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data were analyzed systematically to avoid researcher bias and to create an audit trial using 
different data analysis steps. Because this study is highly exploratory and searches the conditions 
under which a BSC is perceived as enabling, one of the authors mined the data to set up a coding 
protocol. A combination of two approaches was used: a literature review and the use of the 
interview data to identify interesting paths. To this end, the data were transferred to NVivo 8. All 
interviews were coded using the coding protocol defined  in the previous step. In the next step, the 
transcribed interviews were coded again. This coding was performed in a step separate from both 
the development of the coding protocol and the first coding of the data. Afterwards, matrices were 
used to systematically organize the data to identify emerging patterns. In a last step, these patterns 
were checked by comparing the data findings for case A and case B to determine whether a pattern 
was simply coincidental or appeared systematically in both cases, with several interviews in each 
case.  
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BSC AS AN ENABLING TECHNOLOGY 
In the literature review, it became clear that the BSC will be an enabling technology when the four 
features of enabling formalization are fulfilled. The BSC must be internally transparent, offer repair 
possibilities, be flexible, and be globally transparent. To fulfill these features the execution of the 
development process is of utmost importance. Previous research indicated that the development 
process should be experienced-based, allow experimentation, and build on employees’ 
professionalism (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In both companies, the development process was set 
up to contain those conditions to enhance the enabling nature of the BSC. Managers were invited to 
cooperate during workshops to choose the best strategy and key performance indicators for their 
department. Hence, the companies integrated the experience of their managers in the process. 
Consequently, in both companies, the development of the BSC was based on the experience of 
managers and employees of the organization. The workshops during the development process made 
it possible to experiment with the performance measures the managers wanted to integrate in the 
BSC. Consequently, experimentation was allowed during the development process. The workshops 
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were organized by a consulting firm, which provided a clear view of the development process1, and 
allowed managers to be involved in the process. As a result, managers could make departmental 
efforts. This opportunity to make departmental efforts can stimulate professionalism (Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008). The aforementioned characteristics allow the enabling nature of the BSC to be 
augmented (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008).  
 
4.2 PERCEPTION ON THE BSC AS AN ENABLING TECHNOLOGY 
The variables needed to enhance the enabling nature of the BSC (experimentation, experience-based 
and professionalism) are present in both cases. Nevertheless, middle managers of only one of the 
companies perceived the BSC as an enabling technology. Only these managers reported that the four 
features (internal transparency, repair, flexibility, and global transparency) are present. In other 
words, despite the integration of the pivotal variables to support the enabling nature of the BSC in 
the development process,  the managers of case B perceived the BSC as an enabling technology. In 
case A, most managers did not perceive their BSC as being flexible, containing repair possibilities, and 
being internally and globally transparent. The citations below demonstrate the differences in the 
perception on the feature “flexibility”.  
 
“Some situations ask for experience. People with experience could resolve the 
problem, but the BSC does not make this possible. The problem with the BSC is its 
lack of adaptability to the changing environment.” (Interviewee 7, facility manager, 
case A) 
 
“Flexibility when using the BSC is high. When we notice some critical success factors 
that do not measure what they should, we have the opportunity to refine or delete 
them.” (Interviewee 10, head support services department, case B) 
 
The citations show that the middle manager of case B views the BSC as flexible, whereas the middle 
manager of case A sees the BSC as not flexible. Similarly, differences in perception on the presence of 
the features internal transparency, global transparency and repair, were noticed. In Table 4, we 
elaborate on this finding by providing more quotes from middle managers expressing their 
perceptions of the features and whether the BSC fulfills them. The middle managers in case A almost 
always perceived the features as not fulfilled. In contrast, the middle managers of case B mostly held 
a positive view on the presence of the four features in their BSC.  
                                                            
1
 We had insight into the documents that were used to explain the concept strategy-focused organization and 
the timeline of the whole implementation process.  
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“Insert Table 4” 
 
To obtain better insight into the degree to which the BSC did or did not exhibit the features of an 
enabling PMS, we considered all statements regarding the various features. When all statements or 
all but one statement indicated no fulfillment of the features, this was indicated in Table 5 with “- -”. 
When all statements or all but one statement indicated fulfillment of the feature, “+ +” was marked 
in the table. When two or more than two statements showed a more nuanced view on the presence 
(absence) of a feature, but the majority of the statements are positive (negative), a “+”  (“-”) was 
used. Hence, Table 5 indicates that the managers of case A had a negative view of their BSC as 
enabling. All but two statements indicated middle managers in case A did not believe that their BSC 
was internally nor globally transparent and indicated that the BSC offered them no repair 
opportunities. Some of the managers, however, believed that the BSC was flexible. Nevertheless, the 
majority did not perceive the flexibility necessary for a BSC to be an enabling technology. In case B, 
all managers perceived their BSC as being globally transparent. The opinions of the managers toward 
the other features are more nuanced. Most of the managers believe the features are fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, some managers believe internal transparency, the repair possibilities, and the 
flexibility of the system could be optimized.  
 
“Insert Table 5” 
 
4.3. PERCEPTION ON THE BSC: MODE OF PARTICIPATION  
In case A two out of eight interviewees perceived the BSC as enabling, while in case B nine out of 11 
interviewees perceived the BSC as an enabling technology. From the internal documents of the 
consultancy firm and the internal documents of the two cases, we learned that the development 
process and the reason for implementing the BSC were similar in both cases. The format of the 
resulting BSC was also structured in the same way. Although the cases had a similar developmental 
approach, six out of the eight managers of case A did not perceive the BSC as an enabling technology. 
Moreover the presence of experimentation, experience-based, and professionalism during the 
development phase is not sufficient to create an enabling BSC. Therefore, a deeper analysis into the 
interviews and the internal documents is necessary to obtain a clear view on the conditions that 
ameliorate the enabling nature of the BSC during the development process. When discussing the 
developmental phase during the interviews, we noticed differences concerning participation.  
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Prior literature stated that participation in the development of a performance measurement system 
leads to better outcomes, such as increased satisfaction and performance (Kleingeld, Van Tuijl, & 
Algera, 2004). However, participation does not have a consistent effect on performance (Latham, 
Winters, & Locke, 1994). The degree to which participation is applied influences the performance of 
the manager (Hunton & Price, 1997). A high degree of participation is necessary to create positive 
outcomes. For instance, when employees can participate through involvement by advice or 
involvement by doing, augmentation of self-efficacy beliefs can occur (Forbes, 2005; Hunton & Price, 
1994; Judge, 2007). In both cases managers participated in the development process. Four quotes on 
this topic can be found below. The first two quotes are from managers in case A. The third and the 
fourth quote are from managers in case B.  
 
“After two or three sessions, you have finally created a BSC, which is then proposed 
to the management. The things top management don’t like are removed from the 
scorecard, and some things we ‘forgot’ are added. In this way, you are not the 
dominant coalition; you are the dominated coalition.” (Interviewee 2, production 
manager, case A) 
 
“The results (from the workshop) did not surprise me. However, afterwards, top 
management put some things forward that did not match with what we proposed. 
This raises some questions because we only proposed minor changes, with small 
influence on the strategy.” (Interviewee 8, order-to-cash manager, case A) 
 
“I was able to contribute to the development of the BSC during the workshops. I 
helped to create key performance indicators, which made it possible to measure 
pivotal facets to move the organization toward a better execution of the strategy.” 
(Interviewee 12, head of support services department, case B) 
 
“My name was raised when it was decided who would participate in the process. 
However, I did not experience it as an obligation. I wanted to do it. … I have been 
able to be actively involved, and they also listened to what I had to say.” (Interviewee 
16, distribution manager, case B) 
 
Although middle managers in both companies were invited to participate in the development 
process (by advice and by doing), there was no positive effect of participation in case A. In addition, 
other factors than the degree of participation should be considered. From the statements, it is clear 
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that the managers in case A (quotes 1 and 2 above) could not participate profoundly during the 
development of the BSC, in contrast to the managers in case B (quotes 3 and 4 above). Quotes from 
the other managers in both cases point in the same direction (see Table 6). In addition to the 
interviews, the firms’ documents also give the impression of differences in the mode of participation. 
For example, we obtained a copy of the BSC of case A from top management. In this chart, all 
strategy maps for all business units were incorporated. The business unit strategy maps were under 
the corporate strategy map. All information was put on one big sheet of paper. In contrast, in case B, 
most interviewees brought an image of their specific strategy map. They provided explanations of 
how and why certain key performance indicators were integrated. In addition, a few managers told 
us about how they could use Microsoft Excel to implement and withdraw measures.  
 
In our search for an explanation, we found the concepts of true and pseudo-participation. True 
participation is defined as being able to be spontaneous and free in discussions and being able to 
decide whether to accept or reject new things as a group (Argyris, 1953). The citations show that 
within case B, middle managers experienced true participation. In this case eight managers were 
invited to participate from the beginning of the project. All eight managers had the perception of 
true participation. Based on the interviews with the middle managers in case A, we can conclude that 
middle managers in case A perceived the whole process as forced. Argyris (1953) found similar 
findings within a budgeting context and called this forced process “pseudo-participation”. His 
research indicated that top management sometimes wants subordinates to participate and therefore 
invites them to meetings to discuss the budget. However, top management does not appreciate 
subordinates who give their opinion. There is no room for employees to be spontaneous and free in 
the discussion. They do not really have the opportunity to decide as a group, despite being invited to 
meetings to discuss and determine the budget. There is no true participation for these employees. 
They are left with pseudo-participation. This experience was detected in case A. Seven middle 
managers could participate from an early stage to the development process; nevertheless five out of 
seven indicated they encountered pseudo-participation.  
 
Interestingly, two of the managers in case A (interviewee 4 and interviewee 6, both production 
managers) did perceive the BSC as an enabling technology. When searching for an explanation, we 
noticed these managers indicated that they experienced true participation. These managers 
explained that top management kept their proposed key performance indicators in the BSC.  
 
“We were already using performance measures. During the (development) 
discussion, we were able to show that these measures were important for the 
22 
 
organization. The other performance measures that they (top management) found 
important - only one or two – we have also included in the BSC.” (Interviewee 6, 
production manager, case A) 
 
The production manager cited above felt that top management was listening to him, as they only 
wanted to add two additional measures in the BSC. As a result, he perceived true participation. The 
other managers in case A stated that the key performance indicators they found important for their 
business and for incorporation in the BSC were omitted (Table 6). Subsequently, they were left with a 
feeling of pseudo-participation. This strengthens our finding that true participation is a pivotal driver 
for a developmental approach leading to the perception of a BSC as an enabling technology. 
 
As a side remark, we could add that this finding stresses the importance of existing measures when 
introducing a BSC. Previous research already stated the importance of existing measures when 
introducing a PMS (Wouters & Sportel, 2005). The fact that the managers were able to propose 
existing measures to be included in the new developed BSC allowed true participation and 
consequently recognition of the BSC as an enabling technology.  
 
In conclusion, middle managers must have true participation to recognize the BSC as an enabling 
technology. Nevertheless, this does not explain why two managers in case B did not perceive the BSC 
as an enabling technology, while both managers indicated they experienced true participation. To 
obtain a better indication of the underlying influential factors, we examined the interview 
transcriptions of these managers in great detail and compared them to the interviews with the other 
managers of case B. Interviewee 13 (order-to-cash manager case B) stated that the BSC was not 
flexible. This manager indicated that it is difficult to make all of the necessary changes to the BSC. 
She states there are opportunities to make changes, nevertheless it seems impossible to make the 
required changes. This manager told us she needed some things in the BSC that could not be 
implemented. As result, she was left with the feeling that integrating certain pivotal performance 
measures in the BSC is unattainable. Another manager in that company who attended the same 
meetings (interviewee 12, head of support services department) had a very positive view of the 
feature flexibility. Both managers worked within the support services business unit, but they worked 
in different departments. Moreover, interviewee 13 works in a department that is planning to 
change dramatically, by offering services in a totally new business area. Interviewee 13 indicated it 
was impossible to integrate and follow the changing conditions of their department using the BSC. It 
appears that in businesses that are rapidly changing, true participation is not sufficient to create a 
BSC that is perceived enabling.  
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To confirm this line of reasoning, we looked at the statements made by interviewee 11 (production 
manager, case B) on the features of the BSC. We found that interviewee 11 did not believe in repair 
opportunities, as the BSC did not offer a good overview of the business unit. However, the manager 
believed this would improve in the future. He indicated that the business unit had only existed for 
two years2 and that when the BSC was developed, it was difficult to implement the optimal 
measures. Initially, the BSC felt like a bunch of red tape rather than a work instrument. Currently, the 
newly developed performance measures give some indication of how their business unit is doing. 
Nevertheless, the manager believes it will take some additional years to finalize the process and 
identify the appropriate measures that need to be integrated in the BSC to control their business 
unit. This finding suggests that managers of start-up and rapidly changing departments (business 
units) do not perceive the BSC as an enabling technology, despite they perceived true participation 
throughout the development process. Contrary, mature businesses seem to be more robust and 
capable of developing a BSC as an enabling technology.  
 
Notably, we also noticed the importance of participation congruence. Some interviewees did not get 
the opportunity to participate in the process from the beginning (Table 6). This might influence their 
view on participation and the BSC as an enabling technology. Therefore, we asked these managers 
for further details. In response to the question of whether an interviewee found it frustrating that he 
was not asked to participate in the development process from the beginning, he answered: 
 
“No, I did not find it frustrating because if they had asked me to participate, I would 
not have wanted to, because I was a non-believer at the time. So, there was no need 
for me to participate then.” (Interviewee 17, facility manager, case B) 
 
Another manager indicated that she had not been involved in the introduction phase of the BSC. She 
explained it was not a part of her job. In response to asking whether she perceived it as a problem, 
she answered:  
 
“No, when it was interesting for me to participate, they (top management) openly 
asked who wanted to participate.” (Interviewee 14, purchase manager, case B) 
 
                                                            
2
 This production manager works in the business unit that is occupied with the removal of dirty water.  
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Based on these responses, we notice that the middle managers’ desired and actual level of 
participation are aligned. Middle managers who were not involved in the development process also 
indicated that they did not mind not being asked to participate. In addition, all managers that did 
participate in the development process mentioned being pleased that they were involved in the 
project despite experiencing pseudo-participation. Within the accounting information system 
research, Hunton and Price (1994) found that actual and desired participation need to be at the same 
level for participation to be meaningful. People should not participate against their will, and people 
willing to participate should not be left out. When actual participation exceeds desired participation, 
a feeling of saturation arises that negatively influences the effectiveness of participation. In this 
study, it seems that managers that had not been able to participate in the beginning of the 
development process perceived a balance between the level of actual and desired participation. As a 
result, this had no influence on the perception of participation. If the manager experiences 
participation congruence, the moment of getting involved in the development process will not 
influence his/her perception of true or pseudo-participation.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study was to investigate under which conditions the BSC is perceived as an 
enabling technology. Based on field interviews in two Belgian companies we find that middle 
managers’ perception of the BSC as an enabling technology is contingent on the mode of 
participation and their experienced participation congruence during the development process. 
Maturity of the business (unit) is detected as a moderating factor between true participation and 
perception of the BSC. 
 
In our search for the conditions determining the differences in perceptions of the BSC as an enabling 
technology, the case data indicate that the mode of participation is an important determining 
condition. The BSC is only perceived as an enabling technology when middle managers experience 
true participation. True participation means that middle managers are offered the opportunity to 
provide input during the development of the BSC. Moreover, they have the ability to reject or accept 
new measures for the BSC, in agreement with the other middle managers. Contrary, middle 
managers do not perceive the BSC as an enabling technology when top management allows only 
pseudo-participation. In case of pseudo-participation, middle managers are asked their opinion on 
the development of the BSC, but they ultimately feel that their opinion is of no interest to top 
management and their suggestions are not taken into consideration. 
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In both cases, all managers find it important that their levels of actual and desired participation are in 
line with one another, so that they experience a sufficient level of participation congruence. If the 
manager experiences participation congruence, the moment of getting involved in the development 
process will not influence his/her perception of true or pseudo-participation. 
 
A variable that can moderate the effect of true participation on the perception of the BSC as an 
enabling technology is the maturity of the business. Our study discovered that, true participation 
during the development process did not lead to a BSC being perceived as an enabling technology 
when the business was newly developed or was rapidly changing. For instance, one manager did not 
believe in the repair opportunities, as the BSC did not offer a good overview of the business. Another 
manager experienced the BSC as not flexible, because she found it difficult to make the necessary 
changes to the BSC.  
 
The results of this study have practical implications. As enabling systems have a positive outcome on 
managerial and firm performances (e.g., Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008), firms should strive to create and apply the BSC as an enabling technology. 
However, not every developmental approach leads to a BSC that is perceived as enabling, i.e., 
including the four necessary features of repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and 
flexibility. To ensure that managers perceive the BSC as an enabling technology, organizations and 
management accountants should pay attention to the way in which middle managers can participate 
during the BSC development process. During the development process, top management should 
allow for true participation. Pseudo-participation is an impediment and should be avoided.  
 
Next to practical implications, this research also contributes to the literature. Previous studies have 
indicated that an enabling formalization could lead to positive managerial performance outcomes 
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Parker, 2003), making enabling formalization an important topic for further 
research. In addition, scholars stated that the concept of enabling formalization can be translated to 
a management accounting system context (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004) and, more specifically, to 
PMSs (e.g., Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Nevertheless, a PMS is not necessarily perceived as 
enabling. A developmental approach with specific characteristics is needed to create an enabling 
PMS (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). This study indicates that a development approach may lead to an 
enabling BSC only when true participation is created in a mature business (unit) in which managers 
perceive participation congruence.  
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Our study has a number of limitations, which should be considered. First, the number of middle 
managers in this study is limited, and they are drawn from two companies; consequently, the 
findings are subject to sample size and firm selection bias. However, a large number of cases is not 
required for a productive contribution (Ahrens & Dent, 1998). Furthermore, case study research 
offers opportunities for in-depth observation and analysis in a way that permits contextual 
generalizability (Granlund, 2001; Lukka & Kasanen, 1995).  
Second, we selected two companies that had followed a similar developmental approach. The BSC 
implementation process used in both companies aimed to design a BSC with the four enabling 
features, but led to different perception outcomes. This research design offered an excellent 
opportunity to compare two cases that followed a similar development process and identify the 
factors causing the differences in perception outcomes. Although the BSC development processes of 
the two companies were similar, we must be aware of the fact that differences in company size, type 
of business, and level of financial performance could potentially influence the observed enabling 
perceptions. However, during our case study interviews, there was no evidence indicating a direct 
effect of any of these organizational factors on the managers’ enabling perception of the BSC.  
Finally, we are aware that the period since the development of the BSC differs between the two 
companies and there is a potential risk that the time frame since adoption may affect managers’ 
enabling perceptions. As proposed in previous research (Phua, Abernethy, & Lillis, 2011), we used the 
interview structure as an efficient approach to solve this potential problem. During the interview 
process, we only invited the interviewees to reflect on their enabling experience immediately after 
the BSC development process, as the aim was not to study the evolution of the enabling perception 
over time. We found it more important to select two companies that followed the same 
development process (same consulting firm with the same consultants, same approach with 
workshops sessions, top management involvement) to control for differences in development 
approach.  
 
Related to our findings, we also suggest four directions for future research. First, further research 
could use a large survey or experiment to empirically test the proposed relationship between the 
mode of participation and the enabling perception of the BSC. Second, further studies might 
incorporate the time after the introduction of the BSC as a variable of interest. Similarly, a 
longitudinal study might be interesting to investigate the evolution of enabling perceptions by middle 
managers. Research that measures middle managers’ perceptions at different points in time also 
might be helpful in detecting other underlying mechanisms. Third, future research could examine 
whether the impact of the type of participation during the BSC development on the enabling 
perception is contingent on the manager’s level in the organization. Managers at different 
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hierarchical levels of the organization might be affected differently and might use PMSs for different 
reasons. Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the antecedents of true and pseudo-
participation. Previous research indicated that firm characteristics can play a pivotal role in a PMS 
related context (e.g., HassabElnaby, Said, & Wier, 2005; Said, HassabElnaby, & Wier, 2003). For 
example, organizational characteristics could determine why one of the companies had true 
participation and the other organization was mainly characterized by pseudo-participation. The 
concept of true and pseudo-participation definitely needs further research in management 
accounting. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Organizational characteristics 
 
  
 Case A Case B 
Industry and sector Manufacturing, chemical industry Manufacturing, water supply 
Ownership Listed company Semi-government company 
Size  
 # employees 
 # locations in 
Belgium 
 
2,000 
5 
 
700 
2 
Market B2B and B2C B2B and B2C 
Financial performance 
A
 
 Turnover (euros) 
 
 Profit (euros) 
 
 Ratio (profit/ 
turnover) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 
663,800,000 931,900,000 571,400,000 600,400,000 83,240,956 118,713,413 153,136,417 157,785,517 
49,800,000 88,400,000 -150,600,000 175,200,000 10,361,528 9,718,183 15,774,914 6,438,994 
13.33% 9.49% -26.36% 29.18% 12.45% 8.18% 10.30% 4.08% 
Introduction BSC December 2007 September 2004 
A
 To indicate financial performance, the year in which the BSC is developed and the three years following have been selected.  
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Table 2: Data gathering  
 
 Case A Case B Consulting 
company 
First round of 
interviews 
  2 interviews with 
consultant 1 
 
Second round 
of interviews 
 
1 top manager 1 top manager  
Third round 
of interviews 
(middle 
managers) 
1 supply chain  
   manager 
1 supply chain  
   manager 
 
1 facility manager 1 facility manager  
1 raw materials  
   procurement  
   manager 
1 raw materials  
   procurement  
   manager 
 
 1 support services  
   department head 
3 support services  
   department heads 
 
 1 order-to-cash  
   manager 
1 order-to-cash  
   manager 
 
 2 production  
   managers  
2 production  
   managers  
 
 1 planning optimizer 2 distribution  
   managers 
 
 
Fourth round 
of interviews 
  1 interview with 
Consultant1 and 1 
interview with 
Consultant 2 
 
Internal 
documents 
Balanced scorecard, 
strategy map, 
organizational chart 
Balanced scorecard, 
strategy map, 
organizational chart, 
agenda of BSC meetings 
Schedule of 
meetings and 
workshops to 
develop the 
balanced scorecard 
 
Public 
information 
Website information Website information  
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Table 3: Middle managers interviewees’ specifications  
 
Who Case Job title Interview 
duration 
Gender 
Interviewee 1 Case A Raw materials procurement 
manager 
1h06min Female 
Interviewee 2 Case A Planning optimizer 1h00min Male 
Interviewee 3 Case A Supply chain manager 0h45min Male 
Interviewee 4 Case A Production manager 1h25min Male 
Interviewee 5 Case A Support services department 
head 
0h58min Male 
Interviewee 6 Case A Production manager 0h45min Male 
Interviewee 7 Case A Facility manager 0h55min Male 
Interviewee 8 Case A Order-to-cash manager 1h01min Male 
Interviewee 9 Case B Supply chain manager 1h24min Male 
Interviewee 10 Case B Support services department 
head 
0h57min Male 
Interviewee 11 Case B Production manager 1h30min Female 
Interviewee 12 Case B Support services department 
head 
1h54min Female 
Interviewee 13 Case B Order-to-cash manager 1h05min Female 
Interviewee 14 Case B Raw materials procurement 
manager 
1h00min Male 
Interviewee 15 Case B Production manager 1h17min Male 
Interviewee 16 Case B Distribution manager 1h25min Male 
Interviewee 17 Case B Facility manager 1h30min Male 
Interviewee 18 Case B Distribution manager 1h06min Female 
Interviewee 19 Case B Support services department 
head 
1h16min Male 
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Table 4: Quotes on the perception on the BSC as an enabling technology 
 
Interviewee 
(job title) 
Case Quote 
Enabling 
feature 
Ef-
fect 
INTERNAL TRANSPARENCY   
Interviewee 1 
(Raw materials 
procurement 
manager) 
Case A “On the BSC, there are just too many numbers. It is not 
handy when you want to communicate this information 
to colleagues and subordinates.” 
Internal 
transparency 
- 
Interviewee 3  
(Supply chain 
manager) 
Case A “The definition of the critical success factors defined are 
rather vague. In addition, we can use some of these 
figures, but there are still things we miss. There are also 
other needs that must be taken into consideration. 
Because the critical success factors are vaguely defined, it 
is hard to control the department using these factors and 
the BSC.” 
Internal 
transparency 
- 
Interviewee 12 
(Support services 
department head) 
Case B “There is a document from which we can easily conduct 
our performance indicators. In our department’s card we 
can filter out on certain key performance indicators. We 
can see how close we are to the target. Everything 
becomes clear, which facilitates the preparation and 
course of a review meeting. The BSC has all the 
information I need to control my department. It 
highlights points that need to be taken into consideration 
at all times.” 
Internal 
transparency 
+ 
Interviewee 16 
(Distribution 
manager) 
Case B “It is much easier to control the department because the 
BSC and the performance measures give an indication of 
how the department is doing. Everything has become 
much more concrete.” 
Internal 
transparency 
+ 
FLEXIBILITY     
Interviewee 7  
(Facility manager) 
Case A “The BSC is too lumbering. It takes too long to make the 
necessary adaptations.” 
Flexibility - 
Interviewee 10    
(Support services 
department head) 
Case B “Another advantage of the BSC is that you have the 
opportunity to constantly adapt. It is not a fixed 
Flexibility + 
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framework. Don’t get me wrong the BSC gives you a 
framework, but if situations in your department change, 
it is easy to adapt the BSC according to the changes that 
occurred in your department.” 
Interviewee 12     
(Support services 
department head) 
Case B “It is possible for us as department to make changes to 
the scorecard if necessary. It really is our card. I can 
really find my department in it; therefore, it is a very 
useful instrument.” 
Flexibility + 
Interviewee 14     
(Raw materials 
procurement 
manager) 
Case B “We get the opportunity to adapt on a regular basis the 
key performance indicators. We discuss as a group 
whether it would be beneficial to add or remove some 
measures… We definitely have sufficient opportunity to 
propose and make changes.” 
Flexibility + 
REPAIR     
Interviewee 7 
(Facility manager) 
Case A “People know who controls the organization. However, 
if you start looking at the BSC to make decisions, you 
draw incorrect conclusions.” 
Repair - 
Interviewee 9 
(Oder-to-cash 
manager) 
Case B "We see that there are department and corporate 
meetings. These are organized in a different way, how 
we communicate with the top management has 
changed. We talk about the measures and actions that 
could be undertaken when our BSC has a red dot… The 
BSC offers the opportunity to draw some numbers on a 
frequent basis. As a result, it is much easier to react 
because now you know what is going on." 
Repair + 
Interviewee 14 
(Raw materials 
procurement 
manager) 
Case B “It is much easier now (when using the BSC) to define 
action plans and to adapt processes when you notice 
things should run differently.” 
Repair + 
Interviewee 18 
(Distribution 
manager) 
Case B “It is not possible to see how the organization is doing 
and define action plans because everything is changing 
too fast. In addition, I do not believe we always have 
the correct indicators." 
 
Repair - 
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GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY   
Interviewee 6 
(Production 
manager) 
Case A “The idea of providing a clear view of the organization 
and the strategy using the BSC is beautiful; however, it is 
difficult to accomplish this.” 
Global 
transparency 
- 
Interviewee 8    
(Order-to-cash 
manager) 
Case A “It is not possible to obtain a better view of how the 
organization is working and what the organization wants 
to accomplish by looking at the BSC.” 
Global 
transparency 
+ 
Interviewee 9 
(Supply chain 
manager) 
Case B “The BSC makes it possible to detect who is dependent 
on whom. This not only within each department but also 
between departments. It is easier for people to 
determine their place within the organization. You can 
see your place in the company as a whole much more 
quickly. In addition, you better know the consequences 
of your actions and you can take them into account.” 
Global 
transparency 
+ 
Interviewee 15 
(Production 
manager) 
Case B “The BSC helps to give a clear view of the organization. It 
is much easier to obtain a view of a department when 
looking at its BSC.” 
Global 
transparency 
+ 
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Table 5: Perception of the BSC as enabling formalization 
 
Features of BSC as an 
enabling technology 
Internal 
transparency 
Repair Flexibility 
Global 
transparency 
Managers’ perception 
Case A 
− − − − 
Managers’ perception 
Case B 
+ + + + + 
 
“++” 
“- -” 
“+” 
 
 
“-” 
 
all or all but one statement indicate the presence of the feature  
all or all but one statement indicate the absence of the feature 
more than half of the statements indicate the presence of the feature; 
however there are at least two statements that indicate the absence of the 
feature 
more than half of the statements indicate the absence of the feature; 
however there are at least two statements that indicate the presence of the 
feature 
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Table 6: Participation during BSC development 
Interviewee (job title) Case Perception 
of BSC 
Mode of  
participation 
PANEL  A 
Interviewee 1 (Raw materials procurement manager) 
“Instead of implementing the BSC top-down, it would have been 
better implemented bottom-up. In some parts of the organization 
they already had some key performance indicators. It would have 
been better to use those, rather than proposing new ones.” 
Case A Not enabling Pseudo 
Interviewee 2 (Planning optimizer) 
“After two or three sessions, you have finally created a BSC, which 
is then proposed to the management. The things top management 
don’t like are removed from the scorecard, and some things we 
‘forgot’ are added. In this way, you are not the dominant coalition; 
you are the dominated coalition.” 
Case A Not enabling Pseudo 
Interviewee 3 (Supply chain manager) 
“When we came back in the room after the break of the workshop 
on critical success factors, top management proposed some 
factors. All the proposals we made were wiped off. The whole 
process felt like everything was already determined upfront.” 
Case A Not enabling Pseudo 
Interviewee 4 (Production manager) 
"I got involved in the development process. I had the opportunity 
to give content to the strategy. And the strategy was used to make 
a BSC. I also had a large influence on that” 
Case A Enabling True 
Interviewee 5 (Support services department head) 
Was not involved from the beginning of the developmental phase. 
Case A Not enabling N/Ab  
Interviewee 6 (Production manager) 
"We were already using performance measures. During the 
(development) discussion, we were able to show that these 
measure were important for the organization. The other 
performance measures that they (top management) found 
important - only one or two – we have also included in the BSC." 
Case A Enabling True 
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Interviewee 7 (Facility manager) 
"Cohesion is also very important. There must be a link between 
what could be found on paper, and the cooperation and depth. 
This is a problem.” 
Case A Not enabling Pseudo 
Interviewee 8 (Order-to-cash manager) 
"The results (from the workshop) did not surprise me. However, 
afterwards, top management put some things forward that did 
not match with what we proposed. This raises some questions 
because we only proposed minor changes, with small influence on 
the strategy." 
Case A Not enabling Pseudo 
PANEL  B    
Interviewee 9 (Supply chain manager) 
"(During the development process) everyone felt important. 
Important might not be the correct word, but everyone felt that 
their input was taken into account and they could draw part of the 
picture of our company." 
Case B Enabling True 
Interviewee 10 (Support services department head ) 
"(During the development process) you can steer and give 
directions. You also determine the things. … You get encouraged to 
think about the strategy, and are expected to give your view on it. 
It is not that someone for top management tells you what to do, 
you are the one with the role of executor. You give input and are 
allowed to also determine the direction." 
Case B Enabling True 
Interviewee 11 (Production manager) 
"I have been involved with the development of the BSC. I think this 
is important that you and other people in your department get 
involved and can give your opinion on this matter.  
We worked together in small groups to discuss important topics 
and used the outcome to put our BSC together." 
Case B Not enabling True 
Interviewee 12 (Support services department head) 
“I was able to contribute to the development of the BSC during the 
workshops. I helped to create key performance indicators, which 
made it possible to measure pivotal facets to move the 
organization toward a better execution of the strategy.” 
Case B Enabling True 
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b N/A: not applicable (the manager was not involved from the beginning of the developmental phase) 
Interviewee 13 (Order-to-cash manager) 
"During the development, we had a very open discussion. I also 
participated in those groups, but I must say I was not dominant in 
the process. We were with more people and together we formed a 
complementary team. This made it possible to create a BSC. I think 
it was good to do it that way." 
Case B Not enabling True 
Interviewee 14 (Raw materials procurement manager) 
Was not involved from the beginning of the developmental phase. 
Case B Enabling N/Ab  
Interviewee 15 (Production manager) 
"I have been appointed to participate in the process, but I did not 
mind; it shows that the they (top management) feel I am 
important. … We have been able to give a proposal bottom-up in 
which we indicate what we as department find important. It was 
not forced upon us. Top management has made the central 
scorecard by taking things important for them from the scorecards 
the different departments had put forward." 
Case B Enabling True 
Interviewee 16 (Distribution manager) 
"My name was raised when it was decided who would participate 
in the process. However, I did not experience it as an obligation. I 
wanted to do it. … I have been able to be actively involved, and 
they also listened to what I had to say." 
Case B Enabling True 
Interviewee 17 (Facility manager) 
Was not involved from the beginning of the developmental phase. 
Case B Enabling N/Ab  
Interviewee 18 (Distribution manager) 
“We had the opportunity to follow the whole process and make a 
proposition ourselves. There was no top-down implementation.” 
Case B Enabling True 
Interviewee 19 (Support services department head) 
Was not involved from the beginning of the developmental phase. 
Case B Enabling N/Ab  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Data collection time-line  
 
 
 
  February 2009       September 2010 
 
       Listed company:  
 
 1      2  3              4                                      5 
 
       Semi-government company:  
 
      12         3            4                           5  
 
1 = interview consultant 1 (1st round) 
2 = interview top manager (2nd round) 
3 = first interview middle manager (3rd round) 
4 = last interview middle manager (3rd round) 
5 = second interview consultant 1  
      and interview consultant 2 (4th round) 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE EFFECT OF ENABLING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
SYSTEMS ON AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION, CONTROLLED MOTIVATION 
AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
After decades of research, studies on performance measurement systems (PMSs) still deliver ambiguous 
results. The relevance of different types of PMSs and motivational mechanisms to explain the effect of 
management control systems on managerial outcomes has become more salient over the last few years. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how PMSs designed as an enabling formalization 
affects managerial performance. Drawing on the self-determination theory we build a research model 
and describe the motivational mechanisms that play a pivotal role in the PMS-performance relationship. 
In addition, we develop a scale to measure the degree to which a PMS is perceived as an enabling 
formalization and use the scale to test the relationships hypothesized in our research model using 
questionnaire data obtained from 186 managers.  
Our results show that the proposed scale to measure an enabling PMS is adequate. In addition, we find 
that an enabling PMS impacts performance indirectly, through autonomous motivation. Controlled 
motivation, by contrast, has no significant explanatory power in the PMS-performance relationship.   
 
Keywords: enabling formalization, performance measurement system, motivation, autonomous 
motivation, structural equation modelling 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that performance measures influence behaviour (Burney, Henle, & Widener, 
2009; Neely, Mills, Platts, Gregory, & Richards, 1994). Nevertheless, the effect of a performance 
measurement system (PMS) on performance is still poorly understood (Bourne, Melnyk, & Faull, 2007; 
Pavlov & Bourne, 2011). To address this topic Franco-Santos and Bourne (2005) argue that the use of a 
PMS is an important process factor that will influence managerial behaviour. Moreover, the use of the 
PMS determines whether the PMS will contribute to the performance of the organization (Henri, 2006). 
Based on key factors that determine the use of a PMS, different typologies have been developed 
(Franco-Santos, Lucianetti, & Bourne, 2012; Speckbacher, Bischof, & Pfeiffer, 2003; Wiersma, 2009). As 
such, scholars have tried to determine the most appropriate type of PMS to help organizations manage 
their performance. These typologies allow investigation on the benefits and consequences of a PMS; 
however, the existing typologies are not eligible to all research. For example, although Lee and Yang 
(2011) used the typology of Speckbacher et al. (2003), Franco-Santos et al. (2012), indicated they were 
unable to use this typology as it was “too narrow”. That the typology cannot be integrated in every 
situation impedes research on the relationship between PMSs and managerial behaviour. Consequently, 
a typology that allows to situate all types of PMSs on a continuum is requested.  
     
In this study special attention is dedicated to a PMS perceived as enabling formalization. Enabling 
formalization offers a solution for the shortcomings of existing typologies of PMSs.  It offers the 
opportunity to develop a clear and comprehensive typology for processual uses of PMSs (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004). Moreover, it offers the possibility  to locate all types of PMSs (e.g. balanced scorecard, 
performance prism, adapted forms of balanced scorecards) on a continuum. The concept enabling 
formalization was developed by Adler and Borys (1996). These authors defined two types of 
formalization: coercive and enabling formalization., This typology should  not be seen as a dichotomy. A 
system can embody both coercive and enabling elements (Shadur, Kienzle, & Rodwell, 1999). More 
specifically, enabling and coercive formalization are defined as the extremes on a continuum of control 
(Stansbury & Barry, 2007). Bureaucracies and systems on the very left end of the continuum (extremely 
coercive) have not been frequently associated positively with outcome variables (e.g. Cardinal, 2001; 
Parker, 2003). Enabling formalization has the opportunity to ameliorate performance (Li, Lee, Li, & Liu, 
2010; Parker, 2003; Patel, 2011). Consequently, research should  redirect its attention from coercive 
toward enabling types of formalization (e.g. Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Wouters & 
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Wilderom, 2008). As a result, this paper focusses on the right side of the continuum. A scale to easily 
measure the degree to which a PMS is enabling fails to occur. In the light of this deficiency, the first aim 
of this study is to develop a scale to measure the degree to which a PMS is perceived as enabling. This 
scale facilitates the positioning of all PMSs on a continuum indicating the degree to which the PMS is 
enabling. The second aim of this study is to investigate whether and how an enabling PMS affects 
managerial behaviour.  
 
Literature has already indicated that a control system developed and used as an enabling formalization 
can have a positive effect on managerial behaviour (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Helin, Jensen, Sandstrom, 
& Clegg, 2011; Hempel, Zhang, & Han, 2012; Parker, 2003; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). However, a 
direct relationship between a PMS and performance seems to be nonexistent. By contrast, studies on 
formalization indicated that the effect of PMS on performance will be indirect (Kawakami, MacLachlan, 
& Stringfellow, 2012; Parker, 2003). Research on formalization and on PMSs has indicated that the effect 
is more likely to be mediated by a third variable, such as self-efficacy, job tension, mangers’ cognition 
and motivation (Hall, 2008; Parker, 2003). In the prevalent search, a psychological approach has been 
proposed in this process (Otley, 1999), and motivational variables ought to explain the relationship 
between PMS  and performance (e.g. de Leeuw & van den Berg, 2011; Hall, 2008, 2011). According to 
Adler and Chen (2011),  individual motivation is a robust variable to enrich our understanding of how 
management control systems can improve performance. Other research in the domain of formalization 
also indicated the importance of motivation as a mediating variable (e.g. Langfred & Moye, 2004; 
Weibel, 2007). In addition, psychological research stresses the pivotal role of autonomous and 
controlled motivation in a work related context (Ankli & Palliam, 2012; Gagne & Deci, 2005). It is only 
through the introduction of autonomous and controlled motivation that the underlying mediating 
variable problem can be addressed. Neglecting the existence of different types of motivation and 
treating motivation as a unidimensional construct might have led to confounding results. Therefore, self-
determination theory (SDT), a psychological theory that  subdivides motivation into autonomous and 
controlled motivation, will be used as theoretical underpinning in this study. This theory can potentially 
address the underlying driver problem (Adler & Chen, 2011).  
 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this paper considers the use of PMSs. It is 
only recently that authors have started to test whether the use of PMSs actually creates value (Franco-
Santos & Bourne, 2005). Scholars devoted particular importance to the type of PMS in use (Ahrens & 
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Chapman, 2004; Kolehmainen, 2009; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 2006; Speckbacher et al., 2003; Wiersma, 
2009). We extend on existing research by investigating whether an enabling use of a PMS affects 
performance. Second, previous research has argued that the relation between a PMS and performance 
is an indirect one. Therefore, gaining insight into the effect of  the use of a PMS on managerial behaviour 
is indispensable. Psychological variables, and more specifically motivational variables, have been 
proposed to explain the underlying relationship between PMS and performance (Adler & Chen, 2011; 
Hall, 2008). In addition, by integrating  autonomous and controlled motivation, we can deal summarily 
with the possibility of the inclusion of a confounding variable.  
Third, we will develop and use a scale to investigate whether a PMS is perceived as an enabling 
formalization. Through application of the scale the influence of a PMS on managerial behaviour will be 
examined. The development of this scale makes it possible to respond to the call of Bisbe et al. (2007) to 
create constructs that have a sound conceptual specification before being fitted in explanatory models.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the section ‘literature review and hypotheses 
development’, the related literature on the concept of enabling PMSs is outlined. In addition, motivation 
is proposed as an underlying driver in the relationship between PMSs and managerial performance. A 
review on the evolution of the concept motivation is delineated. In the final part of this section the 
theoretical framework and the research hypotheses will be presented. In the method section, details 
about the research data and design are described. Next, a section will be devoted to the results and 
discussion of the findings. Finally, this paper ends with a summary of the findings, combined with an 
overview of the limitations, indications for future research, and practical implications of this research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. ENABLING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
Originally the concept enabling has been developed in a work process context. According to Adler and 
Borys (1996), formal procedures do not have to be designed to make the work process foolproof; they 
could also be designed to enable employees to master their tasks and deal more effectively with its 
inevitable contingencies. This latter type of formalization is called enabling, and is identifiable by four 
features: repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility (Adler & Borys, 1996). Repair 
generates procedures that facilitate responses to real work contingencies. Breakdowns and repairs 
identify problems with formal procedures and become opportunities for improvement. Internal 
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transparency means that users need both an understanding of the logic of the equipment's internal 
functioning and information on the equipment's status. Global transparency refers to technologies that 
are programmed to provide operators with extensive information relating to the status of the broader 
production process. Flexibility holds that machines are programmed to give advice and make 
suggestions, but it is the responsibility of the user to make controlling decisions after the system has 
displayed the requisite data (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
 
In their paper, Adler and Borys (1996) indicated that the conceptualization of enabling and coercive 
formalization could also be used in other contexts. In 2004, Ahrens and Chapman translated the concept 
of enabling formalization and its features to a management accounting context. Other scholars have 
followed their reasoning, and investigated management control systems using the features developed 
by or adapted from Adler and Borys’s (1996) enabling formalization (e.g. Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Cools, 
Emmanuel, & Jorissen, 2008; Davila, Foster, & Li, 2009; Free, 2007; González-Romá, Fortes Ferreira, & 
Peiró, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011; Proenca, 2010; Sundin, Granlund, & Brown, 2010; van der Meer-
Kooistra & Scapens, 2008; Wouters, 2009; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). 
Several subdomains of the management control system context have been scrutinized. Budget systems 
(Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011), self-managed work teams (Proenca, 2010), transfer 
pricing (Cools et al., 2008), development of PMSs (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008), multiple objectives in the design and use of PMSs (Sundin et al., 2010), have been subject of 
research in which the framework of Adler and Borys (1996) has been used as key to explain the findings. 
As such, a definition of the concept enabling has also been developed in the management accounting 
system domain. In general, a PMS as enabling formalization, is one that is perceived by employees as 
facilitating their responsibilities, rather than primarily as control devices for use by senior management 
(Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). In this definition special attention should be given to the term “perceived”. 
An enabling PMS is conceptualized as individual managerial perceptions. In 1999, Liker, Collins, and Hull 
already stated that rules could  sometimes be perceived as coercive and sometimes be perceived as 
enabling. This indicates the importance of the perception of the manager that the PMS is enabling. The 
underlying logic is that managers individually perceive and interpret the PMS, which is used in their 
organization, and base their individual attitudinal and behavioural reactions on these individual 
perceptions (Franco-Santos et al., 2012).  
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The relating features of an enabling formalization (repair, internal transparency, global transparency, 
and flexibility) have less frequently been adapted to the management control system context. Scholars 
often used their own typology of characteristics to measure enabling formalization (e.g. Hoy & 
Sweetland, 2001; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). This has resulted in a wide range of variables used to 
define enabling systems. Consequently, it is hard to lucidly delineate all findings in this domain. Only few 
scholars used the original features to determine the degree to which a system is perceived as enabling 
(e.g. Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011). However, in those studies the topic addressed 
was the budget, not the PMS. Hence, the developed items are related to the budget and the budget 
systems. In this paper we want to create an operationalization of the concept of a PMS perceived as 
enabling. A uniform scale to measure the degree in which a PMS is perceived as enabling can contribute 
to the repeatability and lucidity of current and future research. In addition, we want to show the 
relevance of the concept of enabling in investigating the effectiveness of PMS on motivation and 
performance.  
 
2.2. MOTIVATION 
The SDT does not look at motivation as a unitary concept, as many psychological theorists have done 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). Different types of motivation can be distinguished. In this paper we will categorize 
motivation as autonomous or controlled motivation. Both autonomous and controlled motivation 
consist of different types of motivation. The types the SDT uses are all linked to either intrinsic or 
extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are two overarching types of motivation in the 
SDT (Gagne et al., 2010). Intrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity for the inherent satisfaction of 
the activity itself (Ryan & Deci, 2000). An intrinsically motivated employee is genuinely interested in his 
job and experiences enjoyment while working (Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, & De Witte, 2008). 
Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is defined as doing something for instrumental reasons (Gagne 
et al., 2010). Under this type of motivation people work in response to something apart from the work 
itself, for example a reward, recognition, or dictates of other people (Amabile, 1994). Even though a 
clear distinction between these two types of motivation can be made, the instrumental reasons within 
extrinsic motivation can vary greatly. Therefore, motivation in the SDT has been divided in several types 
of regulation. Regulation concerns the motivational processes that organize and direct behaviours and is 
reflected in people’s reasons for engaging in the behaviours (Vansteenkiste, Ryan, & Deci, 2008). 
Extrinsic motivation can be divided in four types of regulation: external regulation, introjected 
regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Within external 
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regulation people are motivated to obtain a reward or to avoid a punishment (Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, 
& Soenens, 2010). Introjected regulation refers to the regulation of behaviour through self-worth 
contingencies such as ego-involvement and guilt (Gagne et al., 2010). Within this type of regulation, an 
employee works for example to impress colleagues, the boss, family. When people understand and 
endorse the personal value and significance of a behaviour, and as a result, experience a sense of 
freedom in doing it; they have extrinsic motivation under the form of identified regulation 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). Under identified regulation employees perform tasks within their job, not 
because they really like doing those tasks, but, for instance, because they know the organization will 
only perform well when those tasks are done. The last form of extrinsic motivation is integrated 
regulation, which refers to identifying with the value of an activity to the point that it becomes habitual 
and part of the person’s sense of self (Gagné & Forest, 2008). In this situation, an employee’s own goals 
and values coincide with the goals of the company.  
Distinguishing between these different types of regulation is necessary, because the type of regulation 
influences  the outcome variables, such as performance, well-being, and job satisfaction. In the SDT, the 
existence of different types of regulation have resulted in the replacement of the intrinsic/extrinsic 
dichotomy by autonomous and controlled motivation (Roth, Assor, Kanat-Maymon, & Kaplan, 2007). 
The latter categorization is more powerful to make predictions on performance than previously 
developed categorizations (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008), as the distinction between autonomous and 
controlled motivation better represents the link with the underlying regulatory processes and 
accompanying experiences of the different types of motivation (Gagne & Deci, 2005) underlying 
feelings, and locus of causality (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). Through this alignment of underlying 
regulatory processes, accompanying experiences, underlying feelings, locus of causality, a clear view on 
how motivation influences performance can be created.  
Identification, integration, and intrinsic motivation represent autonomous motivation (Gagne et al., 
2010). When for example looking at the resulting consequences, identified motivation and integrated 
regulation are more related to intrinsic motivation than to the other two types of extrinsic motivation 
(external and introjected regulation). Moreover, identified and integrated regulation are together with 
intrinsic motivation, the types of motivation which are driven by an internal locus of causality. In 
addition, these three types of motivation have the same underlying feelings (volition and freedom). 
Being autonomously motivated means being motivated by one’s interest in an activity (i.e., intrinsic 
regulation) and/or because one realises the importance of the activity to his/her organization or 
himself/herself (i.e., identified or integrated regulation). External and introjected regulation, on the 
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contrary, are driven by stress and pressure, and both types of motivation have an external locus of 
causality (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). External and introjected regulation involve the regulation of 
behaviour with the experiences of pressure and coercion to think, feel, or behave in particular ways 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). In the controlled versus autonomous motivation categorization, external 
regulation and introjection represent controlled motivation.  
 
2.3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Previous research indicated that an enabling formalization can have a positive effect on managerial 
outcomes (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Helin et al., 2011; Hempel et al., 2012; Parker, 2003; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008). Nevertheless, research on the effect of an enabling PMS on performance has 
delivered equivocal results. Therefore, scholars suggest the introduction of motivation as a mediating 
variable in this relationship. However, to make good predictions on performance outcomes, motivation 
should not be treated as a unitary concept. The SDT indicates differentiation between autonomous and 
controlled motivation to facilitate proper prediction building (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008). As the 
resulting types of motivation, autonomous and controlled motivation, are associated with different 
underlying feelings (Gagne & Deci, 2005), behaviours for engaging (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008), and 
resulting outcomes (e.g. Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; Wong-On-Wing, Guo, & Lui, 2010), these types of 
motivation will intertwine the relationship between an enabling PMS and performance differently.  
 
Adler and Borys (1996) already indicated that autonomous motivation is positively associated with 
identified motivation. They base their prediction on the research of Ryan and Connell (1989), who 
indicated that with identified motivation people internalize goals and the discipline necessary to reach 
those goals. Autonomous motivation will be improved when the three basic psychologival needs are 
supported (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Forest, 2008). These three basic psychological needs comprise 
the need for relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Relatedness refers to the desire to feel 
connected to others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The need for competence represents an individuals’ 
desire to feel effective in interacting with the environment (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Van den Broeck, 
Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010). The need for autonomy means that the employee has 
the need to feel rational and to experience a sense of choice and psychological freedom when carrying 
out the activity (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Van den Broeck et al., 2010). Even when employees have to follow 
others’ requests and depend on others, they can still experience autonomy satisfaction (Van den Broeck 
et al., 2010). Consequently, these needs can be fulfilled in a work context in which an enabling PMS is 
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used. The opportunity to react through repair possibilities will give the users of the PMS a feeling of 
autonomy. When the PMS gives managers indication on the performance measures, and offers 
managers possibilities to solve problems, managers will experience freedom as they can choose the 
actions based on the information. This supports the need for autonomy. Since accurate information is 
delivered to identify and implement actions, the manager’s need for competence will be satisfied. 
Managers’ understanding of the PMS itself and of its underlying rational (internal transparency) will 
support the feeling of competence. The users of an enabling PMS often experience a clear view on the 
organization (global transparency). This can enhance the feeling of relatedness as they have a good 
indication of how their function fits the organization as a whole. Flexibility, which holds that managers 
are actively involved in the development and use of the PMS will give managers a feeling of autonomy, 
as they get discretion over the system. As a result, an enabling PMS holds the opportunity to augment 
the three basic psychological needs. Hence autonomous motivation can increase. Based on the 
argumentation outlined above, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: A PMS used as an enabling formalization is positively related to the level of autonomous 
motivation.  
 
Controlled motivation, on the other hand, is expected to be higher when employees encounter feelings 
of stress and pressure. Moreover, an external locus of causality is associated with controlled motivation 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). By contrast, an enabling PMS, in which the features are highly supported, 
avoids a situation in which the users feel pressured and stressed. As stated above, repair possibilities, 
flexibility, global and internal transparency support the three basic psychological needs. Subsequently, 
the level of autonomous motivation can increase. Therefore, we expect no positive relation between an 
enabling PMS and controlled motivation. On the contrary, the more enabling the PMS, the less likely the 
managers will seek for external pressures such as rewards, promotion opportunities and deadlines to 
augment their motivational level. The more enabling the PMS, the smaller the feelings of pressure and 
stress. Consequently, we expect that a PMS used as an enabling formalization will be associated with a 
low amount of controlled motivation. Based on the reasoning above, we formulted the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1b: A PMS used as enabling formalization is negatively associated with the level of controlled 
motivation.  
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The SDT literature has shed some light on the expected relationship between motivation and 
performance, which has confirmed the relevance of the bifurcation of motivation in autonomous and 
controlled motivation. Research on the relationship between the different types of motivation and 
performance has been opulent. Previous studies argue that autonomous, more than controlled 
motivation, is associated with greater performance (e.g. Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; Wong-On-Wing et 
al., 2010). Despite the difference in level of influence, both autonomous and controlled motivation are 
associated with active involvement (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). As a result, we argue that both 
autonomous and controlled motivation are positively associated with managerial performance, and 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of autonomous motivation is positively associated with managerial 
performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: The level of controlled motivation is positively associated with managerial performance. 
 
All these relationships can be found in the research model shown in Figure 1.  
 
“Insert Figure 1 here” 
 
3. METHOD 
We gathered data through an online questionnaire survey conducted in Belgium and used  structural 
equation modelling  to test out hypotheses. In particular, we investigate (1) whether a PMS used in an 
enabling way improves performance, and (2) whether and how  autonomous and controlled motivation 
influence this relationship. We also further elaborate on the development of items to create a construct 
to measure the degree in which a PMS is perceived as an enabling technology.  
  
3.1. DATA AND SAMPLE 
To endorse the appropriateness of this quantitative research and the data collection, we employ best 
practice data collection techniques (Chenhall & Smith, 2011). Therefore, we follow the suggestions 
made by Dillman (2000) and introduce different pre-tests. First, the questionnaire was pre-tested by two 
business professors, one psychology professor, and one strategic management consultant. These 
experts were asked to evaluate and give suggestions to improve the face validity of the questionnaire. 
Second, two first-level managers filled out the questionnaire to evaluate the understandability, clarity, 
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and ambiguity of the survey. At the same time, they pre-tested the online version of the questionnaire. 
This enabled us to detect problems with the use of the online questionnaire. When the two first-level 
managers tested the survey, one of the authors was present to observe difficulties in filling out the 
questionnaire. In addition, the managers had the possibility to ask questions whenever they thought 
items or questions were unclear. Afterwards the author asked them about the difficulties they perceived 
while filling out the questionnaire. Third, the online version of the questionnaire was sent to 36 
managers, participating in a course “Economics for non-economists”. Six managers, or 16.67%, returned 
the questionnaire. On the basis of these different pre-tests minor adaptations to the formulation of 
some items were made to improve understandability and clarity, and to reduce ambiguity.  
 
Data were collected using a questionnaire administrated to managers of Belgian organizations. We 
obtained a list of 2,150 managers from a commercial mailing list provider. The 2,150 managers have 
been selected from a database containing 202,779 organizations. This database is chosen as starting 
point, as it offers personal e-mail addresses of managers. As a result, we were offered the opportunity 
to directly contact respondents employed at a managerial level. Within this database we selected e-mail 
addresses from managers working in an organization located in the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, as 
the questionnaire has been developed in Dutch. Moreover, as the focus is on organizations with a 
performance measurement system, only organizations with a work force of at least 100 employers are 
retained for this research. Organizations with less than 100 employees are more likely to be small-scaled 
or family-owned, hence less likely to use a PMS. Within the resulting amount of potential organizations, 
926 different organizations were selected. Within each organization one to six managers were randomly 
selected. Managers within the same company were located in different business units, holding different 
functions. The selection procedure eventually resulted in  a data base of 2,150 respondents. We chose 
members of the management team as informants since they should be knowledgeable about the 
performance measurement system. These managers were sent an e-mail to ask their participation in the 
survey. To encourage completion of the questionnaire, participants were promised a summary of the 
results. In addition, we informed the participants that their responses were anonymous. Of the 2,150 e-
mails sent, 178 did not reach the participant due to incorrect e-mail address or due to firm leave. Of the 
1,972 surveys that reached respondents, 796 persons opened the link to the survey. In total 289 (14,65% 
of the reached respondents) returned the questionnaire. The response rate is similar to other 
accounting research (e.g., Artz, Homburg, & Rajab, 2012; Widener, 2007).  
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To control for non-response bias two tests were performed. First, early respondents (first 10%) were 
compared to late respondents (last 10%) for all demographic and model variables. This untabulated 
analysis showed that there were no significant differences for any of the variables. Second, we 
investigated non-response bias by comparing the sector and industry classification of respondents and 
non-respondents. The commercial list of 2,150 managers was used as a guide, as the list holds a random 
selection of respondents of a database which is representative toward the Dutch speaking part of the 
Belgian firm landscape. A χ²-test shows that the proportion of managers in each sector and industry 
classification is not significantly different from the original list of 2,150 respondents. Consequently, the 
results support absence of significant non-response bias.   
 
Demographic information collected from the respondents regards age, gender, company size (number 
of employees), management level (low, middle or top management), and sector and industry 
classification. Of all respondents, 186 (64.36%) were employed by a company using a PMS, whereas 103 
(35.60%)1 were working in a company without PMS. For this study, only the responses of the 186 
managers employed in a company using a PMS are eligible. Table 1 shows the characteristics of these 
186 respondents. An average respondent is 46.5 years old. 86.6% of the respondents is male. The 
management level where respondents hold their position differs from lower management (5.9%) to top 
management (66.7%). The average company size is the category 501 to 1,000 employees. Respondents 
work for organizations in a wide variety of industries, with some concentration in manufacturing (54.3%) 
and services (27.4%). 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
3.2. SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
A scale to measure the degree to which managers perceive the use of a PMS as enabling has not yet 
been operationalized. In the context of management control systems, the concept of enabling 
formalization has mainly been used in field research (e.g.,  Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Cools et al., 2008; 
Free, 2007; Proenca, 2010; Sundin et al., 2010; Wouters, 2009; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008). Although, some operationalizations in the management control system field have 
been executed (Chapman & Kihn, 2009; González-Romá et al., 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011), none of 
                                                            
1
 The Belgian landscape is characterized by a large number of well-established rather large family businesses. 
This explains why 1/3 of the sample indicates his / her organization has no PMS. 
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those focus on PMSs. More specifically, one general scale to measure whether team work is used in an 
enabling way (González-Romá et al., 2009), and scales to measure the enabling use of budgeting 
systems (Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011) have been developed.  
As Bisbe et al. (2007) stress the need for a sound conceptual specification of research constructs prior to 
fitting them to explanatory models, extra attention is paid to the meaning and nature of the construct 
enabling PMS. Therefore, we give detailed information on the conceptualization and item generation of 
the scale to measure the degree to which the use of the PMS is perceived as enabling.   
 
The scale development started from theoretical insights. Adler and Borys (1996) defined enabling 
formalization. These authors used the concept to describe work processes. Enabling formalization is 
indicated by repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility. The definition Adler and 
Borys (1996) gave to these four features is described in Table 2. In 2004, Ahrens and Chapman 
advocated the introduction of this concept to the accounting literature. Many scholars followed their 
example (e.g. Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Cools et al., 2008; Free, 2007; González-Romá et al., 2009; 
Hartmann & Maas, 2011; Proenca, 2010; Sundin et al., 2010; Wouters, 2009; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; 
Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Based on this accounting literature, and taking the original definition of the 
features into consideration, an extrapolation of the concept of work processes to PMSs is made (Table 
2).  
 
“Insert Table 2 here” 
 
A series of indicators have been designed to understand the concept of an enabling PMS. In total 24 
interchangeable items were developed and pre-tested (Appendix A). For the final scales, 12 items which 
are manifestations of the construct remain. All items share an enabling PMS as a common theme, and 
reflect one of the four features, which delivers a first indication that the construct is reflective (Bisbe et 
al., 2007). A second indication that an enabling PMS is a reflective construct has to do with the fact that 
not all features need to be present. In this view, Van der Hauwaert and Bruggeman (2013) give 
indication that the features are to some extend interchangeable.  The items on enabling performance 
measurement system are measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) fully disagree to (7) fully 
agree. Together these items are able to measure the perception of a PMS as enabling technology. The 
Cronbach’s alpha of the four features are displayed in Table 3. The Cronbach’s alpha are good (repair 
.800; internal transparency .782, global transparency .667, and flexibility .679). The exploratory factor 
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analysis of the twelve items indicated a single factor solution that explains 77.59% of the variance.2  
Consequently, the concept of enabling PMS has been conceptualized as a global construct rather than a 
second-order construct or four first-order dimensions. This global construct has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
.907 and has factor loadings that are all but one above .50.3  
 
“Insert Table 3 here” 
 
As mentioned before, the stress is on the term “perceived” as the power of the construct will be for a 
large extent determined by the perception of the manager. Previous research indicated that although 
performance measurement systems often have all necessary functionalities to be an enabling 
technology, these systems are not necessarily perceived as enabling (Van der Hauwaert & Bruggeman, 
2013). The PMS will only be effective if employees consider the PMS as enabling (Wouters & Roijmans, 
2011). Consequently, it is important to consider the perception of the manager on the PMS. 
 
3.3. MEASURES 
Autonomous and controlled motivation have been measured using an adapted version of the motivation 
at work scale (MAWS) (Gagne et al., 2010). Gagne et al. (2010) wanted to extend the possibilities of their 
scale by making the scale available in different languages. The development and validation of the Dutch 
version of the MAWS was running when our questionnaire was designed.4 Since we wanted to work 
with the Dutch version of the scale that was still under development, we conducted a pre-test on the 
items under investigation to avoid validity and reliability problems (Appendix B). Of the 12 items in this 
scale, six are used to measure controlled motivation. The other six items measure autonomous 
motivation. Factor loadings of the items of the two factors are all but four above .60. Details about the 
factor loadings can be found in Table 4. The reliability of the factors controlled and autonomous 
motivation is good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .819 and .749 respectively.  
 
                                                            
2
 To clarify the elements of this newly developed construct, an exploratory factor analysis should be 
performed before conducting a confirmatory factor analysis in the structural equation model (Fullerton, Kennedy, 
& Widener, 2013).  
3
 Table 2 shows the factor loadings of enabling PMS from the factor analysis that comprises all dependent 
and independent variables (enabling PMS, controlled motivation, autonomous motivation, and performance). The 
exploratory factor analysis of the 12 items on enabling PMS separately has not been integrated in this paper, as it 
is in the same line as the overall factor analysis. 
4
 This scale is validated and published: (Gagné et al., 2014) 
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“Insert Table 4 here” 
 
Performance was measured using the scale of Mahoney et al. (1965). In this scale managerial 
performance is measured along nine dimensions. Of those dimensions, the last one measures overall 
performance. Participants are asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale whether their performance is 
above or below average (1= well below average, 7= well above average). This scale has been used 
frequently in accounting studies  (e.g. Burkert, Fischer, & Schaffer, 2011; Chong & Chong, 2002; Chong & 
Johnson, 2007; Hall, 2008; Marginson, 2005; Sholihin & Pike, 2009). 5 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We examined the research model by conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using a two-step 
approach. In a first analysis we evaluated the fit of the measurement model. In a second phase, the 
structural model was examined. We made use of Lisrel 9.10 to conduct the analyses. As the variables are 
not normally distributed -but only slightly skewed to the right-, and the sample is not very big, the 
default estimation method (maximum likelihood) is the most appropriate estimation method.6 
                                                            
5
 Although all items load on performance without indication of severe cross loadings, there are three items 
that display a rather low factor loading (below .60). First, items 7 (measuring performance in negotiating) and item 
8 (measuring performance in representing) have a rather low loading. Negotiating is described as purchasing, 
selling, or contracting for goods or services; tasks negotiations, contacting suppliers, dealing with sales 
representatives, advertising products, collective bargaining, selling to dealers or customers. Representing in this 
scale is defined as advancing general organizational interests through speeches, consultation, and contacts with 
individuals or groups outside the organization; public speeches, community drives, news releases, attending 
conventions, business club meetings. That these two items (negotiating and representing) have rather low loadings 
has also been the case in other research (e.g. Hall, 2008). However, as the loading is still reasonable (above .40) we 
decided not to delete the items for this construct. We argue that it is not unreasonable these items differ from the 
other items to measure performance in planning, investigating, coordinating, evaluating, supervising, and staffing. 
Negotiating and representing are often linked to the sales department, and sales is often a different department in 
many organizations. Therefore it is comprehensible managers rate their performance in this domain differently 
than toward the other domains the scale distinguishes (planning, investigating, coordinating, evaluating, 
supervising, staffing). Second, item 2 has a low factor loading. This item measures the performance of managers in 
relation to how they score themselves on investigating. Investigating is seen as collecting and preparing 
information, usually in the form of records, reports, and accounts; Inventorying, measuring output, preparing 
financial statements, recordkeeping, performing research, and job analysis. As this is an important task of a 
manager and no cross-loading of this item with one of the other constructs has been noted, we decided to leave 
this item in the measurement. 
The items 2, 7, and 8 show no severe deterioration of the construct. In addition, when item 2, item 7, and item 8 
were deleted from the analysis, no significant differences could be detected. 
6
 Due to the small deviation from normality we also conducted the robust maximum likelihood method, as 
this method is more robust against violations from non-normality (however more susceptible to small sample 
sizes). As a result, an asymptotic covariance matrix has been calculated in PRELIS. As the sample size is not 
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4.1. DESCRIPTIVES 
The mean, median, and standard deviation of the dependent and independent variables are shown in 
Table 5. The correlation coefficients, also displayed in this table, do not exceed the reliability 
coefficients, providing evidence of discriminant validity (Fullerton et al., 2013). From an untabulated 
analysis we know that multicollinearity is unlikely since none of the variance inflation factors exceeds 
2.0 and the tolerance statistics are all under 1.0. 
 
“Insert Table 5 here” 
 
4.2. MEASUREMENT MODEL  
Measurement model fit was evaluated using multiple fit indices as proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999).7 
The root mean square error approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), the standardized 
root mean square residuals (SRMR)], and χ² / degrees of freedom (df) are selected as complementary 
measures. The goodness of fit index was not introduced for analysis as it is sensitive to the number of 
items included in the model (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). Consequently, the fit of the model 
would be underestimated by this measure. Instead of this goodness of fit index an incremental fit index 
such as the comparative fit index should be preferred. The model shows a good fit (Table 6), as a CFI of 
.95 is combined with a SRMR of .067, and a RMSEA of .057 (Dekker, 2008; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, 
& Tatham, 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Also the χ² over the degrees of freedom (764.89 / 489 = 1.564) 
indicates that the model fits the data well. In behavioural research χ² / df < 3 also indicates a good fit 
(Iacobucci, 2010).  
 
“Insert Table 6 here” 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
normally distributed, the Satorra-Bentler χ² is preferred. This measure controls for non-normality. The results from 
the robust maximum likelihood method were similar to those from the maximum likelihood method.  
7 
In this model four variables are measured. The model needs to be theoretically identifiable. The T-rule (Bollen, 1989) 
indicates the number of unknown parameters needs to be smaller than k (k+1)/2 in which k equals the number of observed 
variables in the model. In our model there are 72 unknown parameters, and we have 33 observed variables. As a result, the 
model is theoretically overidentified, if all parameters can be defined uniquely, which makes it possible to test the model.  
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4.3. STRUCTURAL MODEL 
The fit statistics for the structural model are given in Table 7. To investigate the effect of an enabling 
PMS on performance, and the mediating role of motivation, three different models were tested 
(Appendix C). The proposed model ( = structural model SA) is the model that shows the best fit. The fit 
statistics indicate that this model reproduces the sample data well. CFI is .95. The RMSEA and SRMR are 
below the .08 cut-off value (.055 and .069 respectively). χ² over df delivers a value of 1.566, which is 
well below the proposed cut-off value of three. 
 
“Insert Table 7 here” 
 
The structural model SA provides statistical evidence for most of our hypotheses. The path coefficients, 
t-values, and R² statistics of the model SA are depicted in Figure 2 and Table 8. Concerning the impact of 
an enabling PMS on motivation, evidence for hypothesis 1a has been found. An enabling PMS positively 
influences autonomous motivation as proposed in hypothesis 1a (t = 5.11). In addition, no confirmation 
for hypothesis 1b, which states that an enabling PMS has a negative association with controlled 
motivation, could be found (t = -.73). Indicating the degree in which a PMS is perceived as enabling does 
not influence the level of controlled motivation. This could be due to the fact that the pressure and 
stress delivered by a PMS that is not very enabling is smaller than expected. Perhaps the system needs 
to be more on the left of the continuum toward the extreme coercive side to have any effect on 
controlled motivation.  
 
“Insert Figure 2 and Table 8 here” 
 
One-tailed Z tests of the equality of coefficients suggest a significant effect of autonomous motivation 
on performance [p (Z) <.01, t = 3.62]. Controlled motivation on the other hand does not have a 
significant effect on performance [p (Z) <.05, t = -1.16]. These findings are generally consistent with 
previous research on autonomous motivation, which indicates that autonomous motivation enhances 
performance (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; Mills, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Furthermore, autonomous 
motivation has a bigger impact on outcome variables than controlled motivation (Vansteenkiste et al., 
2010; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010). A less positive view on controlled motivation occurred in our 
research, as a negative, nevertheless, insignificant effect between controlled motivation and 
performance occurs. This contradicts our hypothesis, as we suspected the effect would be positive. In 
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short, we can conclude that autonomous motivation explains variability in performance, not controlled 
motivation. Consequently, evidence for hypothesis 2a, which states that the higher the level of 
autonomous motivation, the higher managerial performance, has been found. In contrast, no evidence 
for hypothesis 2b, stating a positive relationship between controlled motivation and performance, has 
been found. The results do not indicate a positive effect of controlled motivation on performance. The 
effect is not significant (t = -1.16). As a result, the role of controlled motivation is even smaller than 
expected. This finding, might be explained by a stream in literature that does not recognize the direct 
relation between motivation and individual performance. According to scholars in this stream, 
motivation leads to work involvement or effort (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; De Cooman, De Gieter, 
Pepermans, Jegers, & Van Acker, 2009; Mills, 2011). Moreover, it is through effort that a change in the 
level of performance is possible (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Given this potential role of effort, we 
investigated whether the effect of motivation on performance is mediated by effort (Appendix D). From 
the conducted analyses we conclude that the introduction of effort does not contradict or change any of 
the findings. The pivotal role of autonomous motivation is stressed in this relation (t = 4.48). Moreover, 
effort has a positive impact on performance (t = 4.42). In addition, controlled motivation remains 
marginally non-significant in relation to effort (t = -1.83). Model SD, which includes effort, is not a better 
(nor a worse) model compared to the original model SA (χ² difference = 1.54 < 3.84, α = 0.05). This 
indicates that effort is an additional explaining factor in this relationship. Although effort is an explaining 
variable, the introduction of the variable did not alter the sign nor the size of previous found 
relationships between autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, and performance. Even though 
the relationship between controlled motivation and effort is non-significant, we should be aware that it 
is only marginally non-significant.  
 
4.4. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
The literature indicates that neglecting the different types of motivation would lead to contradictory 
results. When we simplify the model and integrate controlled motivation and autonomous motivation 
together into one factor “motivation”, no relationship between an enabling PMS and performance can 
be found. Enabling PMS does not predict motivation (t = -1.26). In addition, motivation shows no 
relationship with performance (t = -1.23). The LISREL output also gives indication of a deterioration of 
the structural model. The model SE exceeds practically every proposed threshold of the fit indices. CFI 
(.91) felt below the .95 threshold. Despite the degrees of freedom increased, an augmentation of the χ² 
with 213.66 appeared. Consequently, χ² rose to 982.81. Both the AIC (5,675.05) and the χ² difference 
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test (α = .01, 106.83 > 6.63) indicate a tremendous deterioration of model fit compared to model SA. 
More fit statistics of the structural model SE can be found in Table 7. These findings give ground to the 
indication in prior studies regarding the power of autonomous motivation as explaining variable in the 
relationship between management control systems and performance (e.g.; Adler & Chen, 2011; Ankli & 
Palliam, 2012). Therefore, we argue in favour of the use of autonomous and controlled motivation to 
investigate the effect of management control systems on managerial behaviour. 
 
Due to the importance of using subcategories of motivation to explain the relationship between 
enabling PMS and managerial performance, and due to the theoretical indication of the existence of 
more motivation categories than controlled and autonomous motivation, we tried to control for these 
different categories. In this way, we wanted to prevent the existence of confounding variables, which 
could be created by including different types of motivation into one autonomous motivation variable. 
Therefore, we split the autonomous motivation up into an extrinsic and an intrinsic part. This resulted in 
three items to measure extrinsic autonomous motivation (items Autmot 1, Autmot 2, Autmot 3 from 
Table 4 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .688) and three items to measure intrinsic autonomous motivation 
(items Autmot 4, Autmot 5, Autmot 6 from Table 4 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .809). To get more 
insights into how an enabling PMS affects the different types of motivation, constructs to measure the 
three basic psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) are integrated in the model.8 
In addition, as controlled motivation had only a marginally non-significant effect on effort, we decided 
to include effort in this relationship as well. Despite the rather large expansion of the model, the 
expanded model shows a good measurement model fit9 with a RMSEA of .057, a SRMR of .070, and a CFI 
of .95. The χ² over df also shows a good fit (2,272.42 / 1,503 = 1.51). The outcome of the structural 
model (SF) indicates an acceptable fit (RMSEA = .058; CFI = .94; SRMR = .097).10 The results of the 
analysis are depicted in Figure 3. This model strengthens the findings that an enabling PMS enhances all 
three basic psychological needs. Moreover, both the extrinsic autonomous motivation and the intrinsic 
autonomous motivation contribute to the augmentation of effort, subsequently performance. The 
                                                            
8
 To measure the three basic psychological needs, the basic need satisfaction scale (Van den Broeck et al., 
2010) is used. In this scale autonomy, competence and relatedness are measured using six items to measure each 
of the needs. Due to rather high cross loadings between some of the autonomy and competence items, two 
autonomy items and two competence items were deleted from the analysis. This delivered a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.751 for relatedness, .702 for autonomy, and .864 for competence. 
9
 After that the two autonomy items and competence items were deleted from the analysis. 
10
 The mediocre fit of SRMR is most likely due to the small sample size. However, previous research indicated 
that a SRMR between .08 and .10 can be excepted as good. 
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increase in intrinsic autonomous motivation is caused by an increase in each of the three basic needs. 
This confirms previous literature that indicates that through satisfaction of the three basic psychological 
needs an increase in intrinsic motivation appears (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Nevertheless, only competence 
and relatedness show a positive relationship with extrinsic autonomous motivation. The relationship 
between autonomy and extrinsic autonomous motivation appears to be insignificant. In contrast, 
autonomy is the only need that affects controlled motivation. The model shows a negative relationship. 
Noteworthy is that the marginally non-significant relationship between controlled motivation and effort 
became marginally significant in this analysis. This indicates that the results should be interpreted with 
care and further research is necessary to gain better insights in this relationship.  
 
“Insert Figure 3 here” 
 
Previous research indicated that a different use of PMSs at different managerial levels can lead to 
different effects on outcome (Malina & Selto, 2001; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In our study first-level 
managers’, middle managers’, and top level managers’ results have been analysed together. As a result, 
integrating all levels of management can confound results. However, as the purpose of this paper is to 
investigate whether a PMS perceived as enabling formalization leads to improvement of the manager’s 
level of performance, and all managers are asked to indicate the degree to which they perceive the PMS 
as enabling, the possibility of confounding results is largely ruled out. The use of a PMS has been 
confined to the perception of an enabling use. In addition, a preliminary analysis of lower management 
(N = 60)11 and top management (N = 124) has been executed in this study. Most of the statistics felt 
below the threshold (top management: RMSEA = .065; SRMR = .082; CFI = .93; lower management: 
RMSEA = .108; SRMR = .111; CFI = .75). The decrease in observations (due to the split up in two groups) 
might have caused the drop in the fit statistics. As a consequence, the results should be interpreted with 
care. The analyses revealed that the findings for these subcategories are similar to the overall findings 
(Table 9). Only in the top management group the relationship between autonomous motivation and 
performance was no longer significant (t = 1.51). We believe that the decrease in sample size might be 
the cause of this non-significant relationship.  
 
“Insert Table 9 here” 
                                                            
11
 Due to small sample size and similar characteristics of first-level managers with middle managers, these 
two management levels have been analysed together. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical analysis shows that a PMS that is perceived as an enabling formalization will positively 
influence managerial performance. Our study also shows the role of motivation in explaining the 
relationship between an enabling PMS and performance. In addition, the results indicate that 
motivation should not be treated as a one-dimensional construct and that in modelling performance 
effects of enabling PMSs it is optimal to distinguish between autonomous and controlled motivation, as 
suggested by the self-determination theory. More specifically, we show that the autonomous 
motivation of the managers is an important variable mediating the PMS-performance relationship, and 
that controlled motivation has no significant explaining power or might have a small negative effect on 
managerial performance. A PMS that is perceived as an enabling formalization significantly enhances 
managers’ autonomous motivation. This enhanced autonomous motivation positively influences 
managerial performance.  
 
The results of the study contribute to the literature in several ways. The findings add to the literature 
investigating the motivational mechanisms to elucidate how a PMS can improve performance (Burney & 
Widener, 2007; Burney et al., 2009; Hall, 2008, 2011). Moreover, this research contributes to recent 
literature indicating a different categorization of the concept motivation could serve deeper insights on 
managerial outcomes (Adler & Chen, 2011; Ankli & Palliam, 2012). The study also responds to calls to 
investigate the characteristics that determine the effectiveness of a PMS to enhance performance. In 
this view, the framework of Adler and Borys (1996) on enabling formalization has been used. A 
conceptualization and operationalization of this framework in a PMS context has been executed. A scale 
to measure the degree to which a PMS is perceived as an enabling formalization has been developed. 
This scale is used to explore the proposed effect of a PMS perceived as enabling on performance. The 
scale comprises 12 items that are manifestations of the four features (repair, internal transparency, 
global transparency, and flexibility) of an enabling PMS. The features are pointed out as indicators of the 
enabling nature of a PMS (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). 
 
Our results have important implications for the management accounting practice. In driving corporate 
performance managers and controllers have to understand that PMSs can motivate managers in an 
autonomous way. When the corporate managers and controllers primarily want to develop autonomous 
motivation, PMS designers should make sure that the PMS is perceived as an enabling formalization. 
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This implies that managers should be able to influence the PMS-design, and fully understand the need of 
the performance measures. In addition, the resulting performance measures must make sense to the 
managers. Performance reports should provide actionable performance information that help managers 
to identify improvements, better execute their tasks and deal with contingencies. When these 
conditions are met managers feel valued, and they are more likely to be highly autonomously 
motivated.  
 
The current study is subject to several limitations. First, preliminary results on the analyses that control 
for management level reveal similar findings. However, as the fit indices felt below the thresholds, one 
should be careful when interpreting the results. Therefore, future research could repeat this research 
with bigger samples of lower management and / or top management to verify the preliminary results of 
the separate analyses. Second, effort and performance in our study are self-reported variables. Although 
managers are considered the best judges of their own performance (Hall, 2011; Mills, 2011), future 
research could benefit from a more objective measurement of these variables. Consequently, further 
research could benefit from supervisors’ or colleagues’ ratings for effort and performance. 
Third, some of the analyses indicated a non-significant relationship between controlled motivation and 
effort / performance, while other analyses in this study indicate a marginally significant relationship, 
which indicate the existence of a negative effect between controlled motivation and effort. 
Consequently, more research is necessary to investigate this relationship. A more profound view into 
the power and direction of the relationship is necessary. In addition, future research can investigate 
whether confounding variables could further explain the relationship between controlled motivation 
and managerial outcomes, such as effort and performance.   
 
Besides the opportunities for future research that rise from the shortcomings, opportunities for further 
research also rise from the strengths of this study. As a result, further research could use the concepts 
autonomous and controlled motivation in other accounting research to solve equivocal results in 
debates were motivation could serve as explaining variable.   
Another possibility for future research rises from the findings of this paper. From this study, we know 
that a PMS that is designed and implemented in an enabling way has a positive influence on 
autonomous motivation and managerial performance, but the question is now: what happens when 
after the enabling implementation process financial compensation of managers is linked to the 
performance measures? What will be the effect on autonomous motivation and performance? Further 
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research could investigate whether linking financial compensation to performance measures moderates 
the performance effects of enabling PMSs. 
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APPENDIX A 
Previous research has indicated that enabling formalization ought to influence outcomes positively (Adler & 
Borys, 1996; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008), however, empirically this has not been 
tested on a large scale. Moreover, according to the authors’ knowledge no operationalization of an enabling 
PMS has been performed. This makes research on this topic on a large scale difficult. Therefore, the authors 
decided to develop a scale capable of measuring the degree to which a PMS is perceived as enabling. As no 
previous scale has been developed the risks of conceptual misspecification are high. To create a sound 
conceptual specification authors took into account the recommendations proposed by Bisbe et al. (2007). 
Consequently, much attention has been devoted the theory and theoretical issues when defining definitions 
and items to measure the construct. Different steps were taken during the development of the items to 
measure the enabling PMS construct. First, one of the authors started to translate the original features 
(repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility as defined by Adler and Borys (1996)) that 
determine whether a work process is enabling to a PMS context (see Table 3). Moreover, the new definition 
was tested against other literature around this topic, the authors had collected. The authors then discussed 
the clarity and accuracy of the conceptualization of the features until a consensus was reached. Second, for 
each feature six items had been developed that ought to measure the construct. The 24 items were 
developed (see table appendix A1). Third, two experts in the management control domain were asked to 
consider these 24 items and indicate whether (1) they thought the item could measure one of the four 
features. And if so, (2) to which feature it was most likely to be related to. The experts independently looked 
at these questions. The authors afterwards centralized their findings. The items on which the experts could 
not reach consensus were deleted. Attention was also given to items for which the experts indicated they 
were too much alike. Furthermore, if the experts both indicated the item measured another feature, the 
authors contacted them for their reasoning for this categorization. Afterwards the authors discussed about 
this recategorization and decided to follow the recategorization or leave it to be. As a result, 12 items were 
deleted (repair4, repair5, repair6, inttrans4, inttrans6, glotrans1, glotrans3, glotrans5, glotrans6, flex2, flex3, 
flex4). Only one item shifted from feature. Experts indicated inttrans5 was more likely to measure global 
transparency, than internal transparency. Consequently 12 items remained to measure the degree to which 
the PMS is perceived enabling. Each feature was measured by three items. Repair is measured by repair1, 
repair2, and repair3. Internal transparency is measured by inttrans1, inttrans2, and inttrans3. Taken into 
account the recategorization, global transparency is measured by the items inttrans5, glotrans2, and 
glotrans4.  
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Table Appendix A1: Enabling performance measurement system items 
Repair 1 The performance measures help me to start actions for improvement myself. 
Repair 2 The performance measurement system makes it possible to react in time, consequently be able 
to avoid problems. 
Repair 3 The performance measurement system makes it possible to put forward some measures which 
can serve as alarm bells.  
Repair 4 If there are any problems concerning performance measures, only top management is able to 
adapt these.  
Repair 5 I can fix control processes myself where necessary. 
Repair 6 Employees can fix work processes themselves if necessary. 
Inttrans 1 I understand the performance measures in my domain.  
Intrans 2 I understand why certain performance measures are included in my domain.  
Inttrans 3 There is information available about the current condition of the performance measures in my 
domain.  
Inttrans 4 Best practice experiences are exchanged. 
Inttrans 5 The performance measurement system gives me an indication in how I execute my job.  
Inttrans 6 The reasons to put things in the performance measurement system are clear in my domain.  
Glotrans 1 The reasons behind performance measurement system of the organization as a whole is clear. 
Glotrans 2 The link between my own tasks and the goals of the organization are clear.  
Glotrans 3 The performance measurement system helps me to be creative to communicate with the entire 
organization.  
Glotrans 4 The performance measurement systems makes it possible to communicate with the 
stakeholders of the organization. 
Glotrans 5 The performance measurement systems has been explained in detail to all employees. 
Glotrans 6 The performance measurement system has been explained in detail to me.  
Flex 1 I can take decisions on the basis of the performance information delivered by the performance 
measurement system.  
Flex 2 I can take steps myself to improve the performance measurement system.  
Flex 3 My decisions are taken into account when the performance measurement system has to 
change.  
Flex 4 The interface of the performance measurement system can be changed if necessary.  
Flex 5 Performance measures can be added to the performance measurement system to meet specific 
work needs.   
Flex 6 Suggestions on which I can make decisions, arise from the performance measurement system.  
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APPENDIX B 
The authors of the motivation at work scale (MAWS) delivered us the items which were under 
investigation for this new scale, the MAWS-2 (Gagné et al., 2012). To avoid validity and reliability 
problems we decided to pre-test the Dutch MAWS-2. This scale consisted of 59 items that ought to 
measure motivation on three dimensions, with some sub-categories. The first nine items in the scale 
measure the degree to which the employee shows amotivation in his job. Amotivation involves a lack of 
intention and motivation (Gagne & Deci, 2005). To measure controlled motivation 32 items were 
implemented. Items to measure extrinsic regulation (monetary and social drivers and pressures) and 
introjected regulation were integrated. Items on both approach (e.g. receive a bonus, get approval, feel 
proud and worthy) and avoidance (e.g. avoid being fired, avoid losing financial benefits, avoid 
disappointment, avoid guilt) were introduced. The scale also has items to measure autonomous 
motivation. Three sub-categories can be discerned, namely identified regulation, integrated regulation, 
and intrinsic regulation.  
All 59-items were pretested in a Dutch speaking Belgium company which employs 1,375 persons. 770 
employees, which equals to 56% of the population, filled out the questionnaire. The purpose of this pre-
test was to reduce the number of items needed to measure the different types of motivation drastically, 
as the 59-items could induce response bias or increase the questionnaire’s dropout rate. To reduce the 
number of items a multi-step approach has been followed. First, we decide to remove all items that 
were implemented to measure the level of amotivation. The results in the pre-test displayed employees 
had very low level of amotivation. This indicates that people with no work motivation probably leave the 
firm. Consequently, these items cannot add much information. This made it possible to delete the items 
that measure amotivation, which reduced the number of items from 59 to 50. From the 50 remaining 
items, 27 could easily be deleted without damaging the reliability and the validity of the items. With 
those other 23 items, it remained more or less possible to measure all types of motivation (external, 
introjected, identified, integrated, and intrinsic motivation). Nevertheless, some cross loadings (>.40) 
appeared. Due to these cross-loadings, and the fact that we only need to distinguish controlled from 
autonomous motivation, we further reduced the number of items used to measure controlled and 
autonomous motivation in this study. Of the 23 remaining items, 11 were deleted. After deleting those 
items it remained possible to keep a balance in the number of items of the different types of motivation 
(external, introjected, identified, integrated, and intrinsic motivation). Of the 12 remaining items, six are 
used to measure controlled motivation. The other six measure autonomous motivation. Within the six 
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remaining items in each category, the balance between the different subcategories has been maintained 
(2nd column Table 2).  
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APPENDIX C 
To determine which of the models shows the best fit, the χ² difference test (∆χ²/∆df) and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) are used. Model SA represents the fully mediated model, which has been 
proposed theoretically (Figure Appendix C1 panel A). It is important to test whether motivation 
(controlled and autonomous) has explaining power in the relationship between an enabling PMS and 
managerial performance. This has been investigated in model SB. In this model only the direct effect of 
an enabling PMS on performance is investigated. The fit of this model is worse compared to the 
proposed model. The AIC of this model is 5,472.25 (compared to 5,465.39). There is no difference in df. 
As a result, χ² indicates model SB has a worse fit compared to model SA (776.01 > 769.15). Finally, 
model SC is the partial mediated model, in which both the direct effect of an enabling PMS on 
performance and the indirect effect through motivation are introduced. In short, model SC is model SA 
with one additional relationship, namely the direct effect between an enabling PMS on performance. 
The χ² difference test (α=.05) does not show a significant difference between model SC and model SA 
(χ² difference = 1.61 < 3.84). The AIC indicates model SC fits the data slightly worse than the theoretical 
proposed model SA (5,465.78 versus 5,465.39). To determine which of the models should be selected, 
we took several indicators into consideration. According to the χ² and the χ² difference test, the fit of 
model SB is worse compared to the fit of model SA toward the data. No significant difference between 
the fit of the models SA and SC could be detected when using the χ² difference test. Although the SRMR 
shows a slightly better fit of model SC than model SA (SC = .068 vs. SA = .069); the AIC indicated model 
SC performs slightly worse than model SA. In addition, the impact of the direct relationship between 
enabling PMS and performance of model SC is not significant (t = 1.26) (Figure Appendix C1 panel B). 
This implies that the mediator absorbs all explaining power of the direct relationship. As a result, model 
SA is selected as the model with the best fit, and will be used when analysing the results. 
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Table Appendix C1: Model comparison statistics (structural model) 
  Model SA Model SB Model SC 
χ² 769.15 776.01 767.54 
Df 491 491 490 
χ²/df 1.57 1.58 1.57 
RMSEA .055 .056 .057 
SRMR .069 .073 .068 
CFI .95 .95 .95 
AIC 5,465.39 5,472.25 5,465.78 
χ² difference test 
(Model A) 
    1.61 < 3.84 
Notes: n = 186 
 
Figure Appendix C1: Path coefficients and t-values structural model (SA) 
Panel A: structural model SA 
 
**, *  indicates a p-value of <.01, .05 in a one tailed t-test 
Panel B: structural model SC 
 
**, *  indicates a p-value of <.01, .05 in a one tailed t-test  
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APPENDIX D 
To measure effort, the work effort scale (WESC) is used. This scale developed by De Cooman et al. 
(2009) contains ten items that measure effort along three dimensions (intensity, direction, and 
persistence). To ask the participants their opinion of each of the items, a 7-point Likert scale is used. The 
three factors explain 72.67% of the variance. The total scale had a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .90 in 
the original study. With a Cronbach’s alpha of .858 in our study we find additional indication of the 
reliability of the construct. When adding the effort items to the items that measure the constructs 
autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, performance, and enabling performance measurement 
system no significant changes in factor loadings and cross loadings appeared. The factor loadings of 
effort in this analysis are displayed in table D1. A positive significant correlation between effort and 
autonomous motivation and performance has been found. Moreover, no correlation between 
controlled motivation and effort appeared (see table D2). These findings also point toward the positive 
association of autonomous motivation and performance, with effort as mediating variable; and the non-
significant relationship of controlled motivation and managerial outcomes, as no correlation between 
effort and controlled motivation has been found. Although the correlation points toward above 
mentioned relationships, these associations need to be tested formally. Consequently, a measurement 
model and a structural model, containing effort measured with the ten above mentioned items, has 
been developed. Fit statistics of these models, which are displayed in table D3, reveal the measurement 
and structural model containing effort (model SD) are good (CFI =.95, RMSEA =.055, SRMR =.075) and 
does not show a significantly different fit from model SA (χ² difference test = 1.54). Moreover, findings 
of model SA are supported as autonomous motivation has a positive effect on effort (t = 4.48), and 
subsequently on performance (t = 4.42), while controlled motivation has no effect on effort (t = -1.83). 
The latter supports our findings as it indicates that controlled motivation does not influence managerial 
outcomes, as neither effort, nor performance are associated with controlled motivation. The path 
coefficients and t-statistics of model SD are displayed in table D4, and the relationships are visualised in 
figure D1. 
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Table Appendix D1: factor loadings effort 
Effort Items Factor 
   loadings 
Efft1 Persistence I do not give up quickly when something does not work well. .444 
Efft2 Persistence I really do my best to get my work done, regardless of potential 
difficulties. 
.768 
Efft3 Persistence When I start an assignment I pursue it to the end. .604 
Efft4 Intensity I do my best to do what is expected of me. .604 
Efft5 Intensity I am trustworthy in the execution of the tasks that are assigned .597 
Efft6 Intensity I really do my best to achieve the objectives of the organization. .679 
Efft7 Direction I think of myself as a hard worker. .598 
Efft8 Direction I really do my best in my job. .755 
Efft9 Direction I put a lot of energy into the tasks that I commence. .680 
Efft10 Direction I always exert equally hard during the execution of my job. .599 
 
Table Appendix D2: Pearson correlation table effort included 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Controlled motivation 1         
2. Autonomous motivation -.026 1       
3. Effort -.150* .479** 1     
4. Performance -.120 .229** .451** 1   
5. Enabling PMS -.031 .383** .373** .195** 1 
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 
     
 
Table Appendix D3: Model comparison statistics (structural model) with effort 
  Model SD 
χ² 1,332.94 
Df 855 
χ²/df 1.559 
RMSEA .056 
SRMR .076 
CFI .95 
AIC 5,472.25 
χ² difference test 
(Model A) 
1.54 < 3.84 
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Table Appendix D4: Path coefficients, t-statistics, and R² statistics structural model with effort (model 
SD) 
Dependent variables Independent variables    
  Enabling 
PMS 
Controlled 
motivation 
Autonomous 
motivation  
Effort R² 
Controlled motivation -.07                    
(-.80) 
   
.005 
Autonomous motivation  .46              
(5.33)** 
   
.214 
Effort 
 
-.15                 
(-1.83) 
.55                      
(4.48)** 
 
.328 
Performance 
      
.61               
(4.42)** 
.367 
Each cell reports the path coefficient (t-value).  
**,* Indicates a p-value of <.01; .05 in a one-tailed test.   
   
Figure Appendix D1: Results structural model with effort (path coefficients model SD) 
 
**, *  indicates a p-value of <.01, .05 in a one tailed t-test 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Respondents’ characteristics 
      N % Mean SD Min Max 
Firm characteristics   
 
          
  Company size (worldwide) 186 
 
  5.23 2.214 1 9 
  (1) < 50   1 0.5         
  (2) 51 to100   3 1.6         
  (3) 101 to 250   54 29.0         
  (4) 251 to 500   37 19.9         
  (5) 501 to 1,000   24 12.9         
  (6) 1,001 to 2,000   20 10.8         
  (7) 2,001 to 5,000   12 6.5         
  (8) 5,001 to 10,000   8 4.3         
  (9) > 10,001   31 16.7         
  Company sector and industry 186 
 
          
  Private sector       
  
 
Agriculture   1 0.5         
  
 
Manufacturing   101 54.3         
  
 
Services   51 27.4         
  
 
Others   5 2.7         
  
 
Public sector   25 13.4         
  
 
Semi-governmental   3 1.6         
  
  
  
 
          
Individual characteristics   
 
          
  Age 
 
185 
 
  46.5 8.171 27 63 
  Gender 185 
 
          
  
 
Male   161 86.6         
  
 
Female   24 12.9         
  Management level  186 
 
          
  
 
first-level management   
 
5.9         
  
 
middle management   
 
27.4         
   top management    66.7         
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Table 2: Comparison definition four generic features of enabling formalization 
Feature Definition workflow formalization 
Adler and Borys (1996) 
Definition PMS formalization (based on 
recent research within MCS context) 
Repair generates procedures that 
facilitate responses to real work 
contingencies. Breakdowns and 
repairs identify problems with 
formal procedures and become 
opportunities for improvement. 
holds that the PMS is designed to help 
subordinates determine whether the 
performance is under control, and help 
them to identify and implement 
improvement actions to solve occurring 
problems.  
   
Internal 
transparency 
means that users need both an 
understanding of the logic of the 
equipment's internal functioning 
and information on the 
equipment's status. 
requires that managers have a clear 
understanding of the PMS itself and its 
underlying rational.   
 
 
   
Global 
transparency 
refers to technologies that are 
programmed to provide operators 
with extensive information relating 
to the status of the broader 
production process. 
provides users with a wide range of 
contextual information that facilitates a 
better understanding in the broader 
context of the organization.  
   
Flexibility holds that machines are 
programmed to give advice and 
make suggestions, but it is the 
responsibility of the user to make 
controlling decisions after the 
system displays the requisite data. 
holds that the PMS is designed to signal 
variations and deviations to provide the 
managers with insights and learning 
opportunities to help them identify and 
decide on controlling decisions and to 
encourage them to modify the PMS to suit 
their specific work demands.  
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Table 3: Enabling performance measurement system scale items 
ITEMS   
Repair (Cronbach’s alpha = .800) 
Enabling 1 The performance measures help me to start actions for improvement myself. 
Enabling 2 The performance measurement system makes it possible to react in time, 
consequently be able to avoid problems. 
Enabling 3 The performance measurement system makes it possible to put forward some 
measures which can serve as alarm bells.  
Internal transparency (Cronbach’s alpha = .782) 
Enabling 4 I understand the performance measures in my domain.  
Enabling 5 I understand why certain performance measures are included in my domain.  
Enabling 6 There is information available about the current condition of the performance 
measures in my domain.  
Global transparency (Cronbach’s alpha = .667) 
Enabling 7 The performance measurement system gives me an indication in how I execute my 
job.  
Enabling 8 The link between my own tasks and the goals of the organization are clear.  
Enabling 9 The performance measurement systems makes it possible to communicate with the 
stakeholders of the organization. 
Flexibility (Cronbach’s alpha = .679)  
Enabling 10 I can take decisions on the basis of the performance information delivered by the 
performance measurement system.  
Enabling 11 Performance measures can be added to the performance measurement system to 
meet specific work needs.   
Enabling 12 Suggestions on which I can make decisions, arise from the performance measurement 
system.  
All items were administered in Dutch. English translations for communication purposes. 
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Table 4: Exploratory factor analysis: factor loadings for explanatory variables and Cronbach’s alpha 
 
    Items Cronbach'
s alpha 
Factor 
loading 
Controlled motivation  .749  
Conmot1 External 
(social) 
I work to get the other's approval (e.g., supervisor, colleagues, 
family, clients...). 
 .686 
Conmot2 External 
(monetary) 
I work because others (e.g., employer, supervisor...) promise me 
that I will make more money if I  put enough effort in my job. 
 .471 
Conmot3 External 
(monetary)  
I work because others (e.g., employer, supervisor…) promise me 
advancement or promotion opportunities if I  put enough effort in 
my job. 
 .443 
Conmot4 External 
(social)  
I work to avoid disappointing others (e.g., supervisor, colleagues, 
family, clients...).  
 .763 
Conmot5 Introjection I work because, as an employee of this company, I ought to put 
efforts in my job. 
 .593 
Conmot6 Introjection I work because it is my duty vis-à-vis my employer to put efforts in 
my job. 
 .635 
Autonomous motivation  .819  
Autmot1 Identified  I work because what I do in this job has a lot of personal meaning to 
me. 
 .660 
Autmot2 Identified  I work because I personally consider it  important to put efforts in 
my job.  
 .387 
Autmot3 Integrated  I work because this job represents well who I am deep down.  .601 
Autmot4 Intrinsic  I work because I enjoy this work very much.  .767 
Autmot5 Intrinsic I work because this job fits well with the interests I have.  .711 
Autmot6 Intrinsic  I work because the work I do is a lot of fun.  .802 
Performance .783  
Perf1  Planning: determining goals, policies, and courses of action. Work 
scheduling, budgeting, setting up procedures, setting goals or 
standards, preparing agendas, programming.  
 .620 
Perf2  Investigating: Collecting and preparing information, usually in the 
form of records, reports, and accounts. Inventorying, measuring 
output, preparing financial statements, recordkeeping, performing 
research, job analysis.  
 .258 
Perf3  Coordinating: Exchanging information with people in the 
organization other than subordinates in order to relate and adjust 
programs. Advising other departments, expediting, liaison with 
other managers, arranging meetings, informing superiors, seeking 
 .590 
Perf4  Evaluating: Assessment and appraisal of proposals or of reported or 
observed performance. Employee appraisals, judging output 
records, judging financial reports, product inspection, approving 
requests, judging proposals and suggestions. 
 .612 
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Perf5  Supervising: Directing, leading, and developing subordinates. 
Counseling subordinates, training subordinates, explaining work 
rules, assigning work, disciplining, handling complaints of 
subordinates.  
 .784 
Perf6  Staffing: Maintaining the work force of a unit of several units. 
College recruiting, employment interviewing, selecting employees, 
placing employees, promoting employees, transferring employees. 
 .698 
Perf7  Negotiating: Purchasing, selling, or contracting for goods or services. 
Tasks negotiations, contacting suppliers, dealing with sales 
representatives, advertising products, collective bargaining, selling 
to dealers or customers.  
 .317 
Perf8  Repres nting: Advancing general organizational interests through 
speeches, consultation, and contacts with individuals or groups 
outside the organization. Public speeches, community drives, news 
releases, attending conventions, business club meetings.  
 .430 
Perf9  Wh t do I hi k of my o rall performance.  .713 
PMS as enabling technology .907  
Enabling1 Repair The performance measures help me to start actions for 
improvement myself. 
 .786 
Enabling2 Repair The performance measurement system makes it possible to react in 
time, consequently be able to avoid problems. 
 .710 
Enabling3 Repair The performance measurement system makes it possible to put 
forward some measures which can serve as alarm bells.  
 .723 
Enabling4 Internal 
transparency 
I understand the performance measures in my domain.   .707 
Enabling5 Internal 
transparency 
I understand why certain performance measures are included in my 
domain.  
 .761 
Enabling6 Internal 
transparency 
There is information available about the current condition of the 
performance measures in my domain.  
 .791 
Enabling7 Global 
transparency 
The performance measurement system gives me an indication in 
how I execute my job.  
 .632 
Enabling8 Global 
transparency 
The link between my own tasks and the goals of the organization are 
clear.  
 .655 
Enabling9 Global 
transparency 
The performance measurement systems makes it possible to 
communicate with the stakeholders of the organization. 
 .547 
Enabling10 Flexibility 
 
I can take decisions on the basis of the performance information 
delivered by the performance measurement system.  
 .836 
Enabling11 Flexibility Performance measures can be added to the performance 
measurement system to meet specific work needs.   
 .424 
Enabling12 Flexibility Suggestions on which I can make decisions, arise from the 
performance measurement system.  
  .637 
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Table 5: Pearson correlation, mean, median (med), and standard deviation (StDev) 
  1 2 3 4 Mean Med StDev 
1. Controlled motivation 1 
   
2.92 2.83 1.11 
2. Autonomous motivation -.026 1 
  
5.78 5.83 .70 
3. Performance -.120 .229** 1 
 
5.59 5.75 .85 
4. Enabling PMS -.031 .383** .195** 1 5.31 5.33 .59 
  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   
   
 
 
 
    
 
 
Table 6: Model fit statistics (measurement model) 
  Model MA 
χ² 764.89 
df 489 
p-value 0.0000 
RMSEA .055 
SRMR .066 
CFI .95 
Notes: n = 186 
 
 
Table 7: Model fit statistics (structural model) 
  Model SA Model SE 
χ² 769.15 982.81 
Df 491 493 
χ²/df 1.60 1.99 
RMSEA .057 .073 
SRMR .070 .087 
CFI .95 .90 
NNFI .95 .91 
AIC 5,465.39 5,675.05 
χ² difference test 
(Model A) 
  103.66 > 3.84 
Notes: n = 186 
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Table 8: Path coefficients, t-statistics, and R² statistics structural model 
Dependent variables Independent variables  
  Enabling 
PMS 
Controlled 
motivation 
Autonomous 
motivation  
R² 
Controlled motivation -.06                    
(-.73) 
  
0.004 
Autonomous motivation  .45              
(5.11)** 
  
0.200 
Performance 
  
-.10 
(-1.16) 
0.35 
(3.62**)  
0.132 
Each cell reports the path coefficient (t-value).  
**,* Indicates a p-value of <.01; .05 in a one-tailed test.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9: path coefficients, t-statistics lower and top management 
Dependent variables Independent variables 
 
   Top management (N = 124) Lower management (N =60) 
  
Enabling 
PMS 
Controlled 
motivation 
Autonomous 
motivation  
Enabling 
PMS 
Controlled 
motivation 
Autonomous 
motivation  
Controlled motivation -.03         -.09     
 
(-.26) 
  
(-.63) 
  Autonomous motivation  .41 
  
.35 
  
 
(4.08)** 
  
(2.18)** 
  Performance 
 
 -.11 .17 
 
 -.02 .47 
  (-1.00) (1.51)    (-.17) (2.42**)  
Each cell reports the path coefficient (t-value).   
 
  **,* Indicates a p-value of <.01; .05 in a one-tailed test. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Structural model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Path coefficients and t-values structural model (SA) 
 
**, *  indicates a p-value of <.01, .05 in a one tailed t-test 
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Figure 3: Path coefficients structural model (SF) 
 
**, *  indicates a p-value of <.01, .05 in a one tailed t-test 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE EFFECT OF MONETARY REWARDS ON AUTONOMOUS 
MOTIVATION IN AN ENABLING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
CONTEXT  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of monetary rewards on autonomous motivation in an enabling 
PMS context. The study uses survey data from 314 managers from different organizations. The 
results indicate that organizations benefit from performance measurement systems that are 
perceived as highly enabling. A highly enabling PMS leads to a higher level of autonomous 
motivation, when compared to a situation with a minimally enabling PMS or no performance 
measurement system. In organizations where the performance measurement system is perceived to 
be minimally enabling, the results indicate that perceived fairness of individual monetary rewards 
positively affects managers’ autonomous motivation.  The findings also reveal that the more the 
performance measurement system is perceived as enabling, the less effective a fair individual bonus 
is to enhance the level of autonomous motivation of managers.  
 
Keywords: Performance measurement system, autonomous motivation, rewards, individual bonus, 
fairness  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and practitioners have been searching for variables and mechanisms which affect the 
motivation and the performance of managers in order to increase organizational performance. A 
performance measurement system (PMS) can be used to enhance organizational behaviour (Kaplan 
& Norton, 1992). Consequently, organizations spend an enormous amount of time on the 
development of management control systems (Franco-Santos & Bourne, 2005).  
Rewards and incentive systems are key elements of a management control system. Incentives are 
often linked to the PMS. Rewards are considered pivotal in an organization’s motivational arsenal 
(Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). As such, many organizations link monetary rewards to performance 
and believe that so-called ‘pay-for-performance’ positively influences the motivation and 
performance of managers. Nevertheless, scholars who illustrate the importance, relevance, and 
positive impact of rewards (e.g. Fang & Gerhart, 2012; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Rynes et al., 2005) are as 
numerous as scholars who reveal a diminishing effect of rewards on outcome variables (e.g. Falk & 
Kosfeld, 2006; Kohn, 1993; Sliwka, 2007; Stone, Bryant, & Wier, 2010). Consequently, even after 30 
years of research on this topic, scholars still stress the importance of investigating the effect of 
monetary rewards in relation to PMSs (Franco-Santos & Bourne, 2005; Franco-Santos, Lucianetti, & 
Bourne, 2012). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002), for example, indicate that the effect of monetary 
rewards will impact performance indirectly by influencing motivation, and subsequently, effort. 
Other studies on this topic stress the integration of potential mediating and moderating variables, 
such as the magnitude of the bonus (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Pouliakas, 2010) and the degree to 
which the pay is perceived to be fair (Gagné & Forest, 2008).  
 
From the different success stories and failures of the introduction of PMSs, scholars have already 
learned that PMS contexts in which managers work differ widely. In some situations, the PMS is 
developed and used in an enabling way; in other contexts, PMSs are introduced and used in a 
coercive way. Research in the domain of management control has pointed out the importance of the 
systems and processes to be enabling (e.g.; Hempel, Zhang, & Han, 2012; Parker, 2003). Wouters and 
Wilderom (2008) illustrated that manager attitudes are more positive when the PMS is developed 
and used in an enabling way, instead of in a coercive way.  
 
To investigate the role of PMSs and other control related variables on performance, motivation has 
been put forward (Ankli & Palliam, 2012). To define motivation, this study uses the self-
determination theory. This theory distinguishes two types of motivation: autonomous and controlled 
motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Autonomous motivation is argued to be the most effective type of 
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motivation, as it increases job satisfaction and job performance (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; Van den 
Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010). In addition, employees thrive more when 
they are autonomously motivated regardless the level of controlled motivation these employees 
have (Van den Broeck, Lens, De Witte, & Van Coillie, 2013). Consequently, scholars point out the 
importance for organizations to strive for autonomous motivation to motivate employees (Ankli & 
Palliam, 2012). Therefore, this research will focus on the level of autonomous motivation, rather than 
the level of controlled motivation.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether individual monetary rewards can have an effect on 
autonomous motivation when the organization uses an enabling PMS. To accomplish this goal, we 
determine whether the use of enabling PMSs on itself already positively influences the autonomous 
motivation of managers. We then determine whether linking individual monetary rewards to 
performance measures enhances the autonomous motivation.  
 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by focusing on the effect of an enabling 
PMS on autonomous motivation, this study answers the call for more research on the relation 
between performance measurement and managerial performance. (Bourne, Melnyk, Bititci, Platts, & 
Andersen, 2014). In addition, by integrating the effect of individual monetary rewards in the 
relationship between an enabling PMS and autonomous motivation, our research responds to the 
call for more research on the effect of monetary rewards in combination with PMSs (Franco-Santos & 
Bourne, 2005). Third, the interplay between monetary rewards and an enabling PMS is investigated 
while considering the fairness of the reward, the management level, and the magnitude of the 
bonus. These variables are indicated to interfere with the relationship between PMS and managerial 
behaviour.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, our study will be set out in a theoretical 
context. This will include a development of the hypotheses. Second, a description of our study will be 
presented; this will display details on the data collection process and the research methodology. 
Third, the results of the empirical tests will be outlined and the findings will be discussed. Fourth, the 
paper will end with the conclusions, limitations, and opportunities for future research.   
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2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. PMS AND THE PERCEPTION OF AN ENABLING PMS 
The presence of a robust PMS within an organisation results in significant progress towards the 
strategic goals, despite the absence of other factors (MacBryde, Paton, Bayliss, & Grant, 2014). 
Another fundamental tenet of management control systems is to motivate employees to achieve 
organizational goals (Liu & Leitch, 2013). Recent research stresses the importance of using the PMS 
to support operational managers to motivate and enable higher level managers to improve 
operations (Wouters, 2009) and support managers whose performance is being measured (Wouters 
& Roijmans, 2011). This and many other studies have revealed that a PMS is seen both by scholars 
and practitioners as a system capable of improving organizational performance, managerial 
performance, and managerial motivation. Nevertheless, performance measurement and 
management is not without its problems and is accused of delivering an unclear and inconsistent 
impact on performance (Franco-Santos et al., 2012). Consequently, further research into the 
effectiveness of PMSs is necessary. To obtain insights into  effectiveness, scholars have introduced 
the concept of enabling formalization in a management control system context (e.g.; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). This concept finds its origin in the context of workflow 
formalization (Adler & Borys, 1996).  
 
The concept of enabling formalization was originally developed to explain the efficiency and 
flexibility of work processes (Adler & Borys, 1996). This concept was translated into a management 
control system context (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). In its original context, Adler and Borys (1996) 
differentiated between two types of formalization, namely coercive and enabling formalization. 
While coercive formalization aims to force employee compliance, enabling formalization makes 
employees feel facilitated or motivated by the rules and systems in place (Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008).  
Scholars indicate that both enabling and coercive formalization have the power to improve individual 
behaviour (Baum & Wally, 2003; Helin, Jensen, Sandstrom, & Clegg, 2011; Langfred & Moye, 2004; 
Patel, 2011). Although both enabling and coercive formalization are stated to be more constraining 
to an individual’s ability than a lack of formalization, the research indicates that enabling 
formalization is more positively associated with outcome variables, such as autonomy, than coercive 
formalization (Hempel et al., 2012; Langfred & Moye, 2004). Other scholars have found an indication 
toward the superiority of enabling above coercive formalization to increase the mastery of employee 
tasks (Hempel et al., 2012), enlightenment, self-regulation (Helin et al., 2011), and knowledge 
performance (Li, Lee, Li, & Liu, 2010). Moreover, employees are more likely to have a positive 
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attitude toward formalized systems, such as PMS, when it enables them to better perform their 
tasks. It will be more negative if it functions as a mean by which management attempts to coerce 
effort and compliance (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). This indicates that an enabling formalization 
delivers better results toward managerial behaviour than coercive formalization.  Therefore, this 
research focuses on the enabling type of formalization.  
 
An enabling formalization requires the presence of four features: repair, internal transparency, global 
transparency, and flexibility (Adler & Borys, 1996). The first feature is important, as there needs to be 
repair possibilities. The system must make it possible to deal with unexpected breakdowns and 
identify opportunities for improvement (Adler & Borys, 1996). Consequently, repair means that users 
can mend and improve the work process themselves, rather than allowing breakdowns and other 
non-programmable events to force work processes to a halt (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). The second 
essential feature is internal transparency. Internal transparency means that managers fully 
understand the logic of the system and have a view on the status of the elements the system 
comprises (Adler & Borys, 1996). The third feature is global transparency which delivers insights into 
how local systems and elements fit into the organization as a whole (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Such 
a system offers the employees an understanding of where their own tasks fit in the organization as a 
whole (Wouters & Roijmans, 2011). The fourth feature is that it must be possible to adapt the PMS, 
when necessary (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). In other words, it has to be flexible so that users can 
make controlling decisions after enabling systems have provided the information (Wouters & 
Roijmans, 2011).  
 
Adler and Borys (1996) indicated that enabling formalization will influence the level of identified 
motivation. Other research in the management control domain stresses the pivotal role of 
motivation to explain the impact on performance (e.g.; Ankli & Palliam, 2012). Consequently, this 
study will use autonomous motivation to indicate the degree to which an enabling PMS is effective.   
 
2.2. ENABLING PMS AND AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION 
This paper focuses on the self-determination theory (SDT). This theory was developed in 1985 by 
Deci and Ryan. It has recently gained more attention in the management accounting context (e.g., 
Ankli & Palliam, 2012).  
 
SDT states that motivation should not be treated as a unitary concept. Moreover, the theory 
indicates that different motivation types can be distinguished. These types can be categorized in two 
major categories: autonomous and controlled motivation. In a working context, it is important to: (1) 
100 
 
consider SDT’s autonomous and controlled motivation separately, and (2) consider motivation as a 
predictor of performance (Ankli & Palliam, 2012). Consequently, motivation should be considered as 
the outcome variable in this relationship.  
 
Looking at the SDT in more detail illustrates that SDT distinguishes several motivation types (Roth, 
Assor, Kanat-Maymon, & Kaplan, 2007). This new type of categorization defines more than one type 
of extrinsic motivation, next to intrinsic motivation. The types of extrinsic motivation are external 
regulation, introjected regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation (Ryan & Deci, 
2000b). These types differ in the reason for behaving.  
Identified and integrated regulation, together with intrinsic motivation, are the most internalized 
motivation types. Consequently, they are classified under autonomous motivation. When people are 
motivated autonomously, people engage in an activity because they find it interesting; they do the 
activity volitionally (Gagne & Deci, 2005). Autonomous motivation consists of the motivation types 
that involve the experience of volition and choice (Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006). This is in 
contrast to controlled motivation. If people are motivated in a controlled manner, participating in the 
activity involves a sense of pressure or a sense of forced engagement (Gagne & Deci, 2005). 
Controlled motivation involves the experience of being pressured and coerced (Vansteenkiste et al., 
2006). This latter type of motivation contains the two remaining types of extrinsic motivation, 
namely external regulation and introjected regulation.  
 
Autonomous motivation and controlled motivation can both result in high involvement in an activity 
(Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010). However, individuals are most resourceful and 
innovative when they feel motivated, largely as a result of their interests, inner satisfactions, and 
work challenges (Ankli & Palliam, 2012). Therefore, SDT stresses the importance of autonomous 
motivation above controlled motivation (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; Wong-On-Wing, Guo, & Lui, 
2010). Autonomous motivation is more powerful in creating well-being, job satisfaction, and 
performance (Baard et al., 2004; Mills, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Moreover, when employees have 
a high level of autonomous motivation, the level of controlled motivation does change the level of 
effort employees put into their job (Van den Broeck et al., 2013). An organization should therefore 
concentrate on creating autonomous motivation over controlled motivation.  
 
To create and enhance autonomous motivation, there must be an autonomy supportive context 
(Gagne & Deci, 2005). An autonomy supportive context appears when an employee’s three basic 
psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) are supported. The need for 
autonomy involves experiencing choices and feelings, like being the initiator of one’s own actions 
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(deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975; according to Baard et al., 2004). The feeling of competence involves 
being able to attain the desired outcomes for an optimally challenging task (e.g. Skinner, 1995; 
White, 1959; according to Baard et al., 2004). The need for relatedness, which should also be 
satisfied to augment autonomous motivation, refers to a longing to experience positive relationships 
and engages with others (Evelein et al., 2008). SDT suggests that the level of autonomous motivation 
and its enhancement are determined by the degree to which people can satisfy the three basic 
psychological needs (Gagne et al., 2010). Consequently, when the PMS creates an atmosphere in 
which the three basic needs are supported, autonomous motivation can be enhanced. 
 
The presence of an enabling PMS should support the three basic psychological needs. Previous 
research has indicated that companies with a PMS delegate greater autonomy to their business 
units, which consequently affects the organization performance positively (De Geuser, Mooray, & 
Oyon, 2009). The features within an enabling PMS can support the three basic psychological needs.  
First, repair can support the need for competence and the need for autonomy. The presence of 
repair possibilities can provide managers with a feeling of autonomy. Repair can also contribute to 
the managers’ feeling of competence, as they will know how the company wants them to react if a 
certain situation arises. Second, internal transparency supports a feeling of competence as the 
manager will have a clear and detailed tool to control the department. Moreover, internal 
transparency can also lead to an increase in the feeling for autonomy. The third feature is global 
transparency that can support two of the three basic psychological needs. Through the link of local 
systems with the company as a whole, the feeling of relatedness can be supported. In addition, the 
manager will feel more competent as the global transparency makes it possible to have a clear view 
of how local systems and elements fit into the organization as a whole. Fourth is flexibility; flexibility 
will enhance the managers feeling of autonomy, as they obtain the opportunity to change the 
system, if necessary. The need for relatedness might also be supported as the managers feel more 
connected to the organization as they get the opportunity to make changes to the PMS when 
necessary. Consequently, when managers perceive the PMS as enabling, this will lead to an 
autonomy supportive context as the different features (repair, internal transparency, global 
transparency, and flexibility) support the three basic psychological needs. Subsequently, an 
augmented level of autonomous motivation will be created. This indicates the superiority of a 
situation in which an enabling PMS is used over a situation in which no PMS, or no enabling PMS, is 
used.  
 
H1: Managers who perceive their PMS as highly enabling will have a higher level of autonomous 
motivation than managers who do not have a PMS or who perceive their PMS as minimally enabling.   
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2.3. Individual monetary rewards and autonomous motivation 
Research on the consequences of monetary rewards on motivation conflict in their findings (Franco-
Santos & Bourne, 2005; Libby & Lipe, 1992). Some scholars indicated that monetary rewards have a 
detrimental effect on autonomous motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; 
Kunz & Linder, 2012; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2007). Kunz and Linder (2012), for example, found 
that monetary rewards have a detrimental effect on identified and integrated motivation (the two 
extrinsic types of autonomous motivation). Although detrimental effects exist, they do not appear in 
all situations (Deci et al., 1999). Other scholars found that in a working environment, the introduction 
of rewards does not tackle the level of intrinsic motivation and enhance the level of extrinsic 
motivation (Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Van Herpen, Van Praag, & Cools, 
2005). More recently, research on pay for individual performance even indicated that intrinsic 
motivation is higher under pay for individual performance (Fang & Gerhart, 2012). As a result 
research on rewards is currently at a crossroads (Bourne et al., 2014).  
 
Through the literature on autonomous motivation we already became aware of the importance of an 
autonomy supportive context to improve autonomous motivation. Consequently, only when rewards 
enhance the basic psychological needs, a higher level of autonomous motivation can be reached. 
Nevertheless, not every reward in every situation can lead to an enhanced level of autonomous 
motivation. A reward which is linked to the PMS has the opportunity to fulfil the three psychological 
needs. Monetary rewards used in a PMS context are linked to the targets set forward in the system. 
The link with the targets creates the opportunity to support the three basic psychological needs: 
autonomy, competence and relatedness. Autonomy can be enhanced if rewards are linked with the 
defined targets. In this way the manager can get the feeling that he is initiator of his own actions in 
order to reach the defined targets. The manager’s level of competence can be supported when the 
proposed targets are achievable. The feeling of relatedness can be fulfilled if the rewards make it 
possible to strengthen the link between the manager and the organization and his colleagues. 
However, rewards in se are often not sufficient enough to create the necessary support toward 
satisfaction of the three basic psychological needs, hence autonomous motivation. Often only a 
situation characterised with procedural justice is associated with a positive outcome on the needs 
and subsequently on autonomous motivation.  
 
The term procedural justice refers to whether the reward is fairly determined or not (Hartmann & 
Slapnicar, 2012a). Procedural justice is a variable that is positively associated with the three basic 
psychological needs (Boudrias et al., 2011; Gillet et al., 2013). Other psychological research 
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investigating workplace autonomous motivation also indicates that procedural justice supports the 
three basic psychological needs; which subsequently enhances autonomous motivation (Gagné & 
Forest, 2008). Moreover, in a management control context the role of procedural justice is stressed. 
The organizational literature provides evidence that participants find fairness perceptions very 
important. The organizations procedures, which explains important workplace outcomes, such as 
motivation, should be fair (Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2012b). In addition, trust and justice are the 
underlying mechanisms often mentioned as moderators in the relationship between monetary 
rewards and performance related outcomes (e.g.; Burney, Henle, & Widener, 2009; Sliwka, 2007). In 
our study, we will refer to this procedural justice of the monetary reward as fairness. It is expected 
that only when a reward is characterised with a certain degree of fairness an augmentation of the 
autonomous motivation will occur. Fairness of the individual bonus affects the manager’s level of 
autonomous motivation. This results in following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The higher the level of fairness of the individual monetary reward, the higher the level of 
autonomous motivation. 
 
2.4. ENABLING PMS, FAIR  INDIVIDUAL MONETARY REWARDS AND AUTONOMOUS MOTIVATION 
When the PMS in se is already highly enabling, the three basic needs will already be supported and 
the rewards will be less effective as they do not improve the clarity of the strategy and targets of the 
organization. In contrast, in a situation where there is a minimally enabling PMS, the possibility to 
increase the level of autonomous motivation is higher. This increased possibility results from the 
lower level of autonomous motivation that is associated with a minimally enabling PMS. As a result, 
the manager can get indication on the goals of the organization and the expectations toward him, 
through the monetary rewards which are linked to several targets. These targets give an indication 
concerning the goals of the organization. This delivers opportunities that can enhance the 
satisfaction of autonomy, competence and relatedness; and subsequently augment autonomous 
motivation. However, the higher the level of enabling PMS, the lower the power of the rewards. In 
this situation, the managers’ three psychological needs will already be highly supported. The lower 
the enabling PMS, the more support rewards can offer to the three basic psychological needs of the 
managers. 
 
H3: The lower the level of enabling PMS, the higher the strength of fairness of the bonus to affect the 
manager’s autonomous motivation. On the contrary, the higher the level of enabling PMS, the lower 
the positive relationship between fairness of the bonus and the autonomous motivation.  
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Notably, previous literature indicates the pivotal role of the magnitude of the reward. “Pay enough 
or do not pay at all” is the conclusion in Gneezy (2000). Pouliakas (2010) found that individual 
rewards were only effective if they were large enough. As a result, the possibility exists that 
managers who receive a small reward do not experience the predicted outcomes because the reward 
is too small to attract the manager’s attention toward the important targets. Consequently, if the 
reward is not large enough, it will have no opportunity to create direction and clarity. Subsequently it 
will not support the three psychological needs. Hence, autonomous motivation is not affected. 
Therefore, the proposed hypothesis will only occur when the reward is large enough. This study will 
control for this by integrating the magnitude of the bonus as a variable in the analysis.  
 
3. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS AND THE RESEARCH METHODS 
To collect data, an online questionnaire using a sample of Belgian managers was conducted. To 
optimize the quality of the questionnaire, we followed some recommendations of Dillman et al. 
(2009). We extensively pretested the questionnaire in three different steps. First, a pilot test of the 
questionnaire was distributed through a modern communication channel (Linked In) to obtain 
general feedback on our questionnaire. In total, 71 managers filled out the questionnaire as a pre-
test. We used their comments to improve the wording and the order of the questionnaire. Second, 
this second version was reviewed by a multidisciplinary team of academics with knowledge in 
management accounting, self-determination theory and survey design. They made suggestions to 
improve the validity and reliability of the measured constructs and the control variables. This 
resulted in a third draft of the questionnaire. This third draft involved cognitive interviews with two 
potential respondents from the selected population (Dillman, 2000). The purpose of this interview 
was twofold. First, we wanted to make sure that people were able to navigate through the 
questionnaire appropriately. Second, we wanted to be reassured that the respondent interpreted 
the questions in the way it was intended. To realize this, one of the authors was present when these 
two respondents used the online tool to fill out the questionnaire. If they thought it was necessary, 
they could pose the author questions. To finalize this pre-test, the author asked some questions 
related to the questionnaire. For example, the author asked the respondent why he/she hesitated to 
fill out certain questions. Some minor adaptations to the questionnaire were then made, primarily to 
improve readability.  
 
For this study, we used Dutch-speaking managers that worked in production, development, logistics 
and shared service centres at the middle management or top management level at Belgian 
companies with at least 100 employees. We used the minimum size of 100 employees to make sure 
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the selected managers were employed at a company in which a PMS can be used for both control 
and information purposes; in addition, a bonus system might be in use.  
The survey was written in Dutch. Therefore, we sampled Dutch-speaking managers (about 60% of the 
inhabitants of Belgium use Dutch as their native language). Managers from production, 
development, logistics, and shared services were selected to obtain a broad range of respondent 
functions to achieve a larger generalization of the results. We obtained 2,411 e-mail addresses from 
a direct marketing company that specialized in managerial functions. 
  
We sent out an invitation with a link to the online questionnaire to participate in the questionnaire 
to these 2,411 managers (June 2013). 343 managers did not receive the message; they either left the 
firm, changed their e-mail address, or had an email address that gave us a mail delivery failure 
message. Consequently 2,068 managers were reached and 240 managers (11.60%) returned the 
questionnaire after a first invitation. Another 140 managers completed the questionnaire after 
having received a reminder three weeks later. In total, 380 people filled out the questionnaire 
(18.38%). As some of the respondents did not complete the entire questionnaire, their responses 
were removed; this resulted in a total of 358 (17.3%) filled out questionnaires. The response rate is 
comparable with other similar research (e.g. Widener, 2007).  
 
Before analysing the data, some checks to confirm the robustness of the data were performed. This 
involved testing for response bias. A comparison between the early and late respondents was made. 
The first 10% of respondents were compared with the last 10% of the respondents. No significant 
differences on any of the variables (dependent, independent, and control variables) were detected.  
 
We then controlled for outliers. The Cook’s distance analysis indicated two points as possible 
outliers. As these points may distort the outcome and accuracy of the performed regressions, we 
decided to eliminate them from the sample. We also looked at the extreme data points, in relation to 
our dependent variable. Autonomous motivation is a variable measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1: 
completely disagree, 7: completely agree) that is slightly skewed to the right. The data for this 
variable revealed a normal distribution between four and seven. Only respondents had an average of 
less than three. These respondents were deleted from the sample. In this way a normal distribution 
with variance between four and seven appears.  
One other respondent got deleted from the sample, as the respondents’ percentage of maximum 
bonus was smaller than the percentage of the minimum bonus; this survey was eliminated to 
maintain the accuracy of the analyses.  
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In addition, managers at different management levels might use a PMS differently (Malina & Selto, 
2001). Besides using the system to control, formulate strategy and communicate to serve higher-
level managers, a PMS also supports the people whose performance is being measured (Wouters & 
Roijmans, 2011). As a result, managers at different levels might benefit differently from the presence 
of an enabling PMS. The way in which first level managers are able to use the PMS often differs from 
how it is used by middle and top management. To avoid a very heterogeneous group, we deleted the 
first level managers (N=36) from the dataset.  
In total, 314 questionnaires from middle and top managers are used in the analyses. To control for 
differences that might exist between middle and top level managers, a control variable 
“management level” will be used when the proposed hypotheses are tested.  
 
“Insert Figure 1 here” 
 
The demographics of the respondents were split in three groups. Panel A illustrates the data of all 
314 respondents. The analysis of Hypothesis 1 will use the responses of all 314 managers. Concerning 
hypothesis 2, we focused on managers confronted with a PMS (see Figure 1). Managers whose 
organization does not have a PMS are excluded from this analysis. 189  respondents (60.19%) 
indicated that their organization used a PMS. The demographics of these managers can be found in 
Panel B. In addition, of those 189 managers, 115 managers also received an individual monetary 
bonus. For the third hypothesis, only the respondents that received an individual bonus were 
included (N = 115). In Panel C, the demographics of those respondents are displayed.  
 
When looking at the demographics of the respondents, we noticed that most respondents were male 
(approximately 80%). On average, they were 48 years old (Table 1). Most of the organizations were 
situated in the manufacturing or service business (Table 2).  
 
“Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here” 
 
3.1. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
The degree to which a PMS is perceived as enabling is measured using a 7-point Likert scale (Van der 
Hauwaert & Bruggeman, 2014). The scale consists of 12 items measuring the four features of an 
enabling PMS (repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility). The scale was 
pretested and tested in different studies delivering a Cronbach's alpha of .928 (study with 186 
respondents) and .907 (study with 45 respondents). In Table 3, more information on the factor 
loadings and Cronbach's alpha (in this study) is provided.  
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“Insert Table 3 here” 
 
To obtain an indication of the rewards, the respondents had to answer whether their firm did or did 
not make use of individual monetary rewards. Further information about the rewards and the 
reward system was asked when the respondent indicated it was possible to receive a reward. Our 
proposed model makes use of: (1) the magnitude of the individual reward (continuous variable); and 
(2) the level of fairness of the individual bonus (continuous variable).  
The magnitude of the individual bonus was measured by taking the difference between the 
maximum individual bonus managers could receive (in a percentage of net wage) and the minimum 
individual bonus managers could receive (in a percentage of the net wage).  
The level of fairness of the individual reward was measured using three 7-point Likert style questions. 
In total, 134 respondents indicated that they received an individual bonus and answered the three 
questions from which we could deviate the degree to which they perceived the individual bonus as 
fair. The basis for the formulation of these questions was found in a study by Hartmann and Slapnicar 
(2009). An adapted version of the questions were introduced in our questionnaire. In our version, we 
adapted the questions to make them suitable for our research. The items used can be found in Table 
3. Factor loadings were all above .8; Cronbach’s alpha was .901. 
 
Motivation was measured using an adapted version of the second motivation at the work scale 
(MAWS2 scale). This scale was still under construction when the questionnaire was developed and 
sent to the respondents1. As a result, we pretested this questionnaire to check the validity and 
reliability of the items. The pretest resulted in a 12 item scale to measure autonomous motivation 
(six items) and controlled motivation (six items). The Cronbach’s alpha for these two variables were, 
respectively, .832 and .794. In this study, we focus on the effect on autonomous motivation; 
consequently, the six items on autonomous motivation are integrated into the analyses. Information 
on the factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha in this research can be found in Table 3.  
 
The management level is used in this study as control variable. The management level indicates 
whether the manager is a middle manager or a top manager. This variable is introduced as previous 
research indicated that management level differences could lead to differences in managerial 
behaviour (e.g.; Malina & Selto, 2001; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011).  
 
 
                                                            
1
The scale has been validated and published: (Gagné et al., 2014) 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. DESCRIPTIVES 
After the data were collected an initial screening of the variables took place. The descriptives of the 
independent and dependent variables are shown in Table 4. In Panel A, the data of all 314 
respondents are displayed. Panel B illustrates the descriptives of the dependent and independent 
variables of the managers whose organization used a PMS (N = 189). In Panel C the information 
concerning the respondents that have both a PMS and an individual monetary reward (N = 115). 
Although the dependent variable is slightly skewed to the right, it is normally distributed between 
the ranges of 4 and 7.  
 
“Insert Table 4 here” 
 
From the Pearson correlation table, we can conclude that there is no indication of multicollinearity 
(Table 5). This is confirmed by the VIF in the linear regression analyses. No variable exceeded the 
value of 1.2. The correlations indicate a relationship between an enabling PMS and autonomous 
motivation (r = .239, p = .001), as well as between fairness and autonomous motivation (r = .233, p = 
.002). The magnitude of the individual bonus does not correlate with autonomous motivation (r = 
.016, p = .840). Nevertheless, there exists a positive correlation between the magnitude of the 
individual bonus and the fairness of the individual bonus (r = .197, p = .010). The tests with the 
demographic variables (untabulated) indicated that the management level is the only demographic 
variable that is correlated with the dependent or one of the independent variables. The management 
level correlates with fairness (r = .232., p = .002). Consequently, management level will be integrated 
as control variable in the analyses.  
 
“Insert Table 5 here” 
 
4.2. HYPOTHESES TESTING 
Hypothesis 1 which states that managers who perceive their PMS as highly enabling will have a 
higher level of autonomous motivation than managers who do not have a PMS or who perceive their 
PMS as minimally enabling, is tested with an ANCOVA. This first analysis gives us an indication on 
whether having a PMS delivers a higher level of autonomous motivation. The managers whose 
organization has a PMS were compared to the managers whose organization did not have a PMS. A 
comparison between managers with a highly enabling PMS, managers with a minimally enabling 
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PMS, and managers without an enabling PMS was then conducted. To distinguish between managers 
with a highly enabling and a minimally enabling PMS, we split up the managers whose firm had a 
PMS in two groups. The first group perceived the degree in which the PMS is enabling as minimal 
[lower half of median split (< 5.33)], while the upper half experienced a highly enabling PMS (> 
5.33)2. The results pointed toward a significant difference between these three groups (Table 6).  
 
Further analysis through the least significant difference revealed the superiority of a PMS perceived 
as highly enabling. A PMS perceived as highly enabling delivers a level of autonomous motivation 
that is significantly higher than the level of autonomous motivation in the condition where there is 
no PMS (p = .003) or where the PMS is perceived as minimally enabling (p = .029). The level of 
autonomous motivation of a manager that perceives the PMS as minimally enabling does not differ 
significantly from the level of autonomous motivation of the managers whose organization had no 
PMS (p = .525). These findings support Hypothesis 1, indicating the importance of a highly enabling 
PMS. Hence, implementing a PMS is not per se enough to increase autonomous motivation. The 
degree to which the PMS is perceived as enabling plays a pivotal role. These results provide support 
of the pivotal role of enabling when a PMS is implemented and used in the organization.   
 
“Insert Table 6 here” 
 
To investigate the power of rewards when an enabling PMS is in use, a hierarchical regression 
analysis is conducted. The degree to which the PMS is seen as enabling is integrated in the analysis as 
a continuous variable. This continuous variable ought to give us the most detailed information on this 
matter
3
.  
 
Previous research already indicates the importance of several variables. One important variable that 
rose in several management control related studies is fairness. Only a fair individual bonus might 
increase the level of autonomous motivation. Therefore, hypothesis 2 indicates that the higher the 
level of fairness of the individual monetary reward, the higher the level of autonomous motivation. 
This will be tested together with hypothesis 3 in a hierarchical regression analysis. Hypothesis 3 
states that The lower the level of enabling PMS, the higher the strength of fairness of the bonus to 
                                                            
2
 The analysis has also been conducted when using “5” as cut-off to determine whether the PMS is 
minimally enabling rather than highly enabling. This means that the respondent will be classified as perceiving 
the PMS as highly enabling when he/she indicated that on average he/she at least agrees with the statements 
on enabling PMS. The results are the same as when the analysis is done when using the median as cut-off. 
3
 A regression in which the perception on enabling PMS is measured as a categorical variable – as in an 
analysis for Hypothesis 1- has also been conducted. This test delivered the same results.  
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affect the manager’s autonomous motivation. The hierarchical analysis makes it possible to evaluate: 
the effect of an enabling PMS on autonomous motivation while including management level as 
control variable, and the effect of an enabling PMS and fairness of the individual bonus on 
autonomous motivation (full model), while taking the magnitude of the bonus into consideration, 
and controlling for management level. In the full model we can also identify whether the expected 
relationship between fairness and autonomous motivation exists. This method makes it possible to 
compare the additional explaining power of the different models. The results are displayed in Table 7 
and the formula of the full model is shown below. 
 
Autmot = b0 + b1EPMS + b2FAIR + b3MAG + b4MANLEV + b5EPMS*FAIR + b6EPMS*MAG + b7FAIR*MAG + 
b7EPMS*FAIR*MAG + ε     
 
 Autmot = level of autonomous motivation (continuous) 
 b0 = intercept 
 EPMS = degree to which the PMS is perceived as enabling (continuous) 
 FAIR = perception of the degree to which the bonus is fair (continuous) 
 MAG = magnitude of the bonus (continuous) 
MANLEV = dummy management level (categorical: middle/top)  
 ε = error term 
 
The introduction of fairness of the individual monetary rewards can add in explaining the variance. 
The full model displays a R² adjusted of 10%, while the model with only enabling PMS explained 
6.30%. Not only the interaction effect of fairness and an enabling PMS is significant (t = -1.989, p = 
.049); the main effect of fairness on autonomous motivation is significant (t = 2.246, p = .027). As a 
consequence, hypothesis 2 indicating a higher level of fairness is associated with a higher level of 
autonomous motivation is confirmed. In addition, evidence for hypothesis 3 has been found. The 
lower the perception of an enabling PMS, the more the managers’ autonomous motivation increases 
as the bonus is perceived more fair. The higher the perception of the PMS as enabling, the less 
susceptible the manager is towards the introduction of unfair bonuses.  
 
“Insert table 7 here” 
 
In contrast to previous findings on the magnitude of the bonus (e.g.; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; 
Pouliakas, 2010) no deterioration of the findings appeared when the manager gets a small reward. 
Even more, the magnitude of the bonus did not matter at all. A graphical reproduction of the 
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magnitude of the bonus in relation to autonomous motivation (untabulated) revealed data points 
that formed a line with a slope of zero. The regression analysis confirms this finding and extent it by 
indicating no significant relationship on the dependent variable even in combination with fairness 
and enabling PMS. The findings of this study might deviate from those of previous studies as our 
research concentrates on middle and top managers, whereas the previous research uses a sample 
that is representative for the whole population, or uses students as participants in the study. As 
research indicates potential differences might already appear when top and middle managers are 
compared (Malina & Selto, 2001; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011), there might also be differences 
between employees from other organizational levels and students.    
 
In order to visualize the findings, the categorical variable of the enabling PMS, which distinguishes 
between a minimally  perceived and highly perceived enabling PMS (median split), is used
4
. The 
graph (Figure 2) displays the robustness of autonomous motivation in the situation where the 
managers perceive the PMS as highly enabling. When the PMS is perceived as minimally enabling, 
there is a positive association between the managers’ autonomous motivation and the level of 
perceived fairness of the individual bonus. Moreover, the more the individual reward is perceived as 
fair, the higher the level of autonomous motivation. These findings indicate that it is not interesting 
to integrate individual monetary rewards when the PMS is perceived as highly enabling.  
 
“Insert Figure 2 here” 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the effect of monetary rewards on autonomous motivation in an enabling 
PMS context. Our results illustrate that managers’ autonomous motivation is significantly higher 
when the PMS is perceived as highly enabling. In other words, the degree to which the PMS is 
enabling influences the autonomous motivation. In addition, the fairness of the individual bonus 
positively influences the level of autonomous motivation. A significant interaction effect between 
enabling PMS and fairness on autonomous motivation indicates that the effect of monetary rewards 
on autonomous motivation is influenced by the perceived fairness of the bonus. The data indicate 
that in organizations where the performance measurement system is perceived to be minimally 
enabling, the perceived fairness of individual monetary rewards positively affects managers’ 
autonomous motivation.  The findings also reveal that the more the performance measurement 
                                                            
4
 The analysis with the categorization delivered the same results as the analysis with the continuous 
variable on enabling PMS. 
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system is perceived as enabling, the less effective a fair individual bonus is to enhance the level of 
autonomous motivation of managers.  
 
These findings contribute to the discussion on the effectiveness of rewards to improve the 
motivation and performance of managers. In line with the expectations of Bonner and Sprinkle 
(2002) and Fang and Gerhart (2012), we find a positive effect of monetary rewards on autonomous 
motivation. In the situation where the managers’ perceive the PMS as minimally enabling, the 
introduction of monetary rewards improves autonomous motivation. Nevertheless, not all situations 
result in anenhancement of autonomous motivation. Consequently, we cannot completely contradict 
the findings of Kunz and Linder (2012). Those authors are more nuanced and state the possibility of 
the existence of the detrimental effect of rewards on autonomous motivation. Our data do not 
illustrate a detrimental effect, however they show that augmentation of the autonomous motivation 
is practically non-existent in a highly enabling PMS context.   
 
Deci et al. (1999) stated that not every situation will lead to a change in the level of autonomous 
motivation. In our search, we concentrated on individual monetary rewards in a PMS context. The 
integration of the degree to which the PMS is perceived as enabling makes it possible to contribute 
to the search of the consequences of monetary rewards on managerial behaviour. Up to now, there  
have been conflicts in the findings on the effects (Franco-Santos & Bourne, 2005). Distinguishing 
situations with a highly and a minimally enabling PMS makes it possible to make a better prediction 
of the power of rewards. The presence of a highly enabling PMS in combination with a fair monetary 
reward results in only a small change of the autonomous motivation. Nevertheless, when there is a 
minimally enabling PMS in combination with a fair monetary reward augmentation of the level of 
autonomous motivation is discovered.  
 
This research was able to provide some interesting findings; nevertheless, this study also has 
limitations that are worth considering. The first limitation is that the measures in this study were self-
reported measures. Although it is not evident to use self-reported measures to measure managerial 
behaviour, several scholars indicate that self-reported measures are reliable (Hall, 2011; Mills, 2011).  
The second limitation occurs when investigating the effect of rewards. We took monetary individual 
rewards into consideration, which is only a small part of the possibilities an organization has to 
reward their managers. Consequently, a suggestion for further research is to gather more details on 
other rewards (e.g., group rewards, promotion opportunities) used in organizations to stimulate 
motivation and performance.  
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The third limitation possible lies in the research method. We used a large online questionnaire to 
measure the effect of rewards on motivation in an enabling context, which made it possible to collect 
data in  a heterogeneous group of managersand which increased the possibility of generalization. 
However, the counterpart is that such a large sample is very  complex. Hence, as rewards are also 
very multifaceted, it might lead to overlooking some possible confounding variables. This study tried 
to deal with this issue by controlling for certain variables that might influence the relationship (e.g., 
management level). Nevertheless, there might be other confounding factors not previously defined 
in the literature that might have an influence. Executing an experiment could be an interesting line of 
future research to shed light on the investigated relationships, as it is offers the opportunity to 
control certain variables.   
 
This study contributes to practice through the indication of the importance of creating a highly 
enabling PMS. In addition, organizations that have a highly enabling PMS will benefit less from a fair 
individual monetary reward. An organization where the PMS is perceived as minimally enabling will 
benefit from the introduction of individual monetary rewards, but only when the reward is perceived 
as fair. The fairer the reward, the larger the impact of the individual monetary reward on the 
autonomous motivation. The introduction of an individual monetary reward can bring the 
autonomous motivation of managers to the same level as the level of autonomous motivation from 
managers that perceive their PMS as highly enabling. Therefore, organizations should try to achieve a 
highly enabling PMS in order to obtain a high autonomous motivation without the need for 
additional monetary rewards.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Demographiques (company size, gender, age and management level) 
PANEL A 
  
N Freq % Cumul % Mean Med Min Max SD 
Company size 314 
        
 
51 to 100 
 
 
2 .6 .6 
     
 
101 to 250 
 
 
82 26.1 26.8 
     
 
251 to 500 
 
 
53 16.9 43.6 
     
 
501 to 1,000 
 
 
42 13.4 57.0 
     
 
1,001 to 2,000 
 
 
25 8.0 65.0 
     
 
2,001 to 5,000 
 
 
26 8.3 73.2 
     
 
5,001 to 10,000 
 
 
17 5.4 78.7 
     
 
> 10,001 
 
 
67 21.3 100.0 
     
           
Gender 314 
        
 
Male 
 
248 79.0 79.0 
     
 
Female 
 
66 21.0 100.0 
     
           
Age 
 
313 
   
47.81 48 29 65 7.67 
                    
Management level 314 
        
 
Middle manager 
 
172 54.8 54.8 
     
 
Top manager 
 
142 45.2 100.0 
     
           
 PANEL B 
  
N Freq Per-
cent 
Cumul 
perc. 
Mean Med Min Max SD 
Company size 189 
        
 
51 to 100 
 
0 .0 .0 
     
 
101 to 250 
 
43 22.8 22.8 
     
 
251 to 500 
 
29 15.3 38.1 
     
 
501 to 1,000 
 
24 12.7 50.8 
     
 
1,001 to 2,000 
 
17 9.0 59.8 
     
 
2,001 to 5,000 
 
15 7.9 67.7 
     
 
5,001 to 10,000 
 
11 5.8 73.5 
     
 
> 10,001 
 
50 26.5 100.0 
     
           
Gender 189 
        
 
Male 
 
145 76.70 76.70 
     
 
Female 
 
44 23.30 100.0 
     
                    
Age 
 
188 
   
47.92 48 29 65 7.84 
           
Management level 189 
        
 
Middle manager 
 
103 54.5 54.5 
     
 
Top manager 
 
86 45.5 100.0 
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Individual bonus (Y/N) 189 
        
 
No 
 
74 39.2 39.2 
     
 
Yes 
 
115 60.8 100.0 
     
           
 PANEL C 
  
N Freq Per-
cent 
Cumul 
perc. 
Mean Med Min Max SD 
Company size 115 
        
 
51 to 100 
 
0 .0 .0 
     
 
101 to 250 
 
23 20.0 20.0 
     
 
251 to 500 
 
13 11.3 31.3 
     
 
501 to 1,000 
 
13 11.3 42.6 
     
 
1,001 to 2,000 
 
12 10.4 53.0 
     
 
2,001 to 5,000 
 
8 7.0 60.0 
     
 
5,001 to 10,000 
 
7 6.1 66.1 
     
 
> 10,001 
 
39 33.9 100.0 
     
           
Gender 115 
        
 
Male 
 
93 80.9 80.9 
     
 
Female 
 
22 19.1 100.00 
     
           
Age 
 
114 
   
48.21 48 29 65 7.92 
          
Management level 115 
        
 
Middle manager 
 
56 48.7 48.7 
     
 
Top manager 
 
59 51.3 100.0 
     
                    Magnitude bonus (3 groups) 115
        
 
Small 
 
35 30.4 30.4 
     
 
Medium 
 
40 34.8 65.2 
     
  High       
 
40 
 
34.8   100.0                 
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Table 2: Demographiques (industry)  
  PANEL A (N=313) PANEL B (N=189) PANEL C (N=115) 
  Freq % Cum. % Freq % Cum. % Freq % 
Cum. 
% 
Agriculture 3 1.0 1.0 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.9 0.9 
Food 36 11.5 12.5 23 12.2 12.7 16 13.9 14.8 
Textile 5 1.6 14.1 1 0.5 13.2 1 0.9 15.7 
Chemical products, perfum, 
jewelerie 44 14.1 28.1 29 15.3 28.6 20 17.4 33.0 
Metal, machine 
construction 42 13.4 41.5 26 13.8 42.3 14 12.2 45.2 
Construction of carriages, 
furniture, utilities, toys, 
sports goods 39 12.5 54.0 28 14.8 57.1 16 13.9 59.1 
Construction, wood, glass 40 12.8 66.8 20 10.6 67.7 10 8.7 67.8 
Retail and wholesale trade 30 9.6 76.4 15 7.9 75.7 6 5.2 73.0 
Transport 16 5.1 81.5 10 5.3 81.0 6 5.2 78.3 
Shipping 2 0.6 82.1 1 0.5 81.5 1 0.9 79.1 
Hotel and catering industry 1 0.3 82.4 1 0.5 82.0 1 0.9 80.0 
Media (film, television, 
radio) 10 3.2 85.6 5 2.6 84.7 3 2.6 82.6 
Factoring, holdings 13 4.2 89.8 11 5.8 90.5 8 7.0 89.6 
Tourism 5 1.6 91.4 1 0.5 91.0 1 0.9 90.4 
Rental services 6 1.9 93.3 2 1.1 92.1 1 0.9 91.3 
Defense, education, health 
and care sector 5 1.6 94.9 4 2.1 94.2 3 2.6 93.9 
Repair and amusement 
sector 10 3.2 98.1 6 3.2 97.4 5 4.3 98.3 
Other 6 1.9 100.0 5 2.6 100.0 2 1.7 100.0 
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Table 3: Factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha (N = 314) 
    Item Cronbach's 
alpha 
Factor 
Loading 
Enabling PMS  .902  
  Repair 1 The performance measures help me to start actions 
for improvement myself. 
  .769 
  Repair 2 The performance measurement system makes it 
possible to react in time, consequently be able to 
avoid problems. 
  .695 
  Repair 3 The performance measurement system makes it 
possible to put forward some measures which can 
serve as alarm bells.  
  .603 
  Inttra 1 I understand the performance measures in my 
domain.  
  .582 
  Inttra 2 I understand why certain performance measures are 
included in my domain.  
  .722 
  Inttra 3 There is information available about the current 
condition of the performance measures in my 
domain.  
  .773 
  Glotra 1 The performance measurement system gives me an 
indication in how I execute my job.  
  .687 
  Glotra 2 The link between my own tasks and the goals of the 
organization are clear.  
  .688 
  Glotra 3 The performance measurement systems makes it 
possible to communicate with the stakeholders of 
the organization. 
  .642 
  Flex 1 I can take decisions on the basis of the performance 
information delivered by the performance 
measurement system.  
  .672 
  Flex 2 Performance measures can be added to the 
performance measurement system to meet specific 
work needs.   
  .629 
  Flex 3 Suggestions on which I can make decisions, arise 
from the performance measurement system.  
  .688 
Fairness  .901  
 Fairness 1 I have full confidence in the system’s fairness in 
determining the goals that need to be reached. 
 .906 
 Fairness 2 I have full confidence in the system’s fairness in 
determining the individual reward. 
 .927 
 Fairness 3 I believe that the way in which my performance is 
measured is fair. 
 .815 
Autonomous motivation  .764  
  Autmot 1 I work because what I do in this job has a lot of 
personal meaning to me. 
 .804 
  Autmot 2 I work because I personally consider it  important to 
put efforts in my job.  
 .426 
  Autmot 3 I work because this job represents well who I am 
deep down. 
 .704 
  Autmot 4 I work because I enjoy this work very much.  .800 
  Autmot 5 I work because this job fits well with the interests I 
have. 
 .608 
  Autmot 6 I work because the work I do is a lot of fun.  .661 
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Table 4: Dependent and independent variables: mean (M), median (Med), standard deviation (SD) 
  
N 
Autonomous 
motivation Enabling PMS Fairness 
    Mean  Med St dev Mean  Med St dev Mean  Med St dev 
Panel A 
    
      All respondents 314 5.89 6.00 .628 
        No PMS 125 5.77 5.83 .671 
        Low enabling PMS 89 5.82 5.83 .626 
        High enabling PMS 100 6.03 6.00 .543             
Panel B 
    
      Low + high enabling 
PMS 
189 5.93 6.00 .590 6.00 5.33 .821 
      Bonus No 74 5.84 5.83 .653 5.19 5.33 .855 
      Bonus Yes 115 5.98 6.00 .541 5.25 5.33 .801       
Panel C 
    
      Bonus Yes 115 5.98 6.00 .541 5.25 5.33 .801 5.31 5.67 1.39 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlations (Pearson) of dependent and independent variables 
    1 2 3 4 
1. Autonomous motivation Pearson Correlation 1 
   Sig. (2-tailed) 
    
 
N 314 
   2. Enabling performance 
measurement system 
Pearson Correlation .239** 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
   
 
N 189 189 
  3. Fairness Pearson Correlation .233** .204* 1 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .028 
  
 
N 170 115 170 
 4. Magnitude Pearson Correlation .016 0.08 .197* 1 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .840 .393 .010 
   N 170 115 170 170 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).       
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Table 6: ANCOVA effect of PMS on autonomous motivation (N=314) 
 
  Sum of 
Squares 
F-statistic P-value   
Management level (middle vs. top) 1.433 3.760 .053   
Enabling PMS (3 groups) 3.720 4.504 .008  
Post hoc tests Mean   
 No PMS 5.77 vs. low enabling PMS .525b 
 vs. high enabling PMS .003
b
 
 Minimally enabling PMS 5.83 vs. no PMS .525b 
 vs. high enabling PMS .029b 
 Highly enabling PMS 6.03 vs. no PMS .003
b
 
  vs. low enabling PMS .029b 
b
 Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference  
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Table 7: Hierarchical regression effect fairness individual bonus and enabling PMS on autonomous 
motivation (N=115) 
  Reduced  model  Full model 
Variables Coefficient t-statistics p-value Coefficient t-statistics p-value 
Management level (middle vs. Top) .132 1.348 .180 .094 .923 .358 
Enabling PMS  .170 2.763 .007 .781 2.383 .019 
Fairness     .746 2.246 .027 
Magnitude     .080 .976 .331 
Enabling PMS x Fairness    -.127 -1.989 .049 
Enabling PMS x Magnitude    -.018 -1.008 .316 
Fairness x Magnitude    -.014 -1.011 .315 
Enabling PMS x Fairness x 
Magnitude 
   .003 1.04 
 
.301 
F-value 4.837  .010 2.585  .013 
Adjusted R² .063   .100   
N 115     115     
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Graphical illustration dataset 
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Figure 2: Effect of fairness and enabling performance measurement system on autonomous 
motivation  
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of this dissertation was to test how an enabling performance measurement system (PMS) 
affects managerial behaviour and the underlying drivers and mechanisms explaining this relationship. 
More specifically, a search was conducted for the drivers determining whether the PMS was 
perceived as enabling, along with a companion search for the underlying mechanisms explaining the 
level of managerial performance in a context where an enabling PMS was used. Therefore, the 
research approach of this dissertation consisted of two parts. The first part was the first study to 
investigate the possibility of a PMS to be enabling. The research question was “Under which 
conditions is a PMS perceived as enabling?” Examining the effect of an enabling PMS on managerial 
behaviour is the second part where the second study answered the questions of "Whether an 
enabling PMS can affect managerial performance?" and "Whether there are mediating variables that 
need to be taken into consideration?" The third study elaborated on the findings of the second study, 
and investigated the power of individual monetary rewards when the organization has an enabling 
PMS.  
This last chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the dissertation. The findings of the three 
studies are brought together to provide a general overview of the effect of an enabling PMS on 
managerial behavior. Furthermore, the contextual and methodological limitations are discussed and 
opportunities for future research are highlighted. This chapter ends with an elaboration on the 
theoretical contributions and the implications for practice.   
 
1. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
1.1 CONDITIONS TO BE AN ENABLING PMS 
This research revealed that a PMS can be enabling. Consequently, it adds to findings of previous 
literature that discussed the development and use of enabling PMSs (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; 
Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). There are four features underlying an enabling PMS: repair, internal 
transparency, global transparency and flexibility. However, a PMS that has these four features will 
not automatically be an enabling PMS. The willingness of the organization to develop an enabling 
PMS by having the four features is not sufficient to create a PMS that is perceived as enabling.  
 
This study detected that the perception of the manager toward the PMS plays a pivotal role. If 
organizations provide the possibility to participate during the development and implementation of 
the PMS, managers must experience true participation. This means that managers are offered 
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opportunities to actively think and cooperate in the development process of the PMS. Only when 
managers have true participation they will perceive the PMS as enabling. When managers experience 
pseudo participation, meaning that they are promised participation in the process but feel their 
opinions and suggestions are not taken into consideration, they often do not perceive the PMS as 
enabling. Notably, when the manager does not feel the need to participate, not providing the 
opportunity to participate will have no influence on the perception of the PMS as enabling. This 
implies there is no relationship between the perception of the PMS as enabling and the manager’s 
opportunity to participate in the development process if the manager had no participatory 
aspirations.  
 
1.2. EFFECT OF AN ENABLING PMS ON MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE AND MOTIVATION 
The findings of the second study and third study indicated that the degree to which the PMS is 
perceived as enabling is important. The results indicated that the higher the degree to which the 
PMS is perceived as enabling, the higher the level of managerial performance. The relationship 
between an enabling PMS and managerial performance is mediated by the manager’s level of 
autonomous motivation. There is a positive association between an enabling PMS and autonomous 
motivation, and autonomous motivation and managerial performance. These positive results gave 
rise to the question whether rewards can add to the level of autonomous motivation.  
 
The debate on the power of monetary rewards has been going on for decades. The findings of 
scholars indicating the pivotal role of rewards to create strategic alignment and enhance 
organizational performance (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002) contrasted sharply with the discovery of the hidden 
cost of rewards (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Kohn, 1993). More recently, the views on the topic of rewards 
are more nuanced. Scholars have pointed out that the partial settings might be the basis for the 
equivocal findings on this topic (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). Studies to fill this research gap continue, but 
the performance-reward issue is far from being resolved. Prior literature stressed the relevance of 
motivation in the search for the effectiveness of monetary rewards (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; 
Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006).  
 
The third study followed this line of research and investigated the impact of monetary rewards on 
autonomous motivation. It added to prior research (Decoene & Bruggeman, 2006; Franco-Santos, 
Lucianetti, & Bourne, 2012; Malina & Selto, 2001) as it found evidence that the PMS can have 
negative effects on motivation. When the PMS is perceived as being minimally enabling, an individual 
monetary reward that has a low level of fairness is associated with a low level of autonomous 
motivation. The higher the perceived fairness of the individual monetary reward, the higher the level 
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of autonomous motivation. This indicates that there exists a detrimental effect of monetary rewards 
on motivation if this reward is perceived as unfair. The third study showed more nuanced findings of 
the effect of rewards when the PMS was perceived as highly enabling. In this situation, the fairness of 
the individual monetary reward will not influence the level of autonomous motivation. As a result, 
these findings further indicate the pivotal role of enabling. The degree to which a PMS is enabling 
must be taken into account when research on individual monetary rewards is conducted.  
 
Notable but not surprising is that controlled motivation was not influenced either positively or 
negatively by the degree to which the PMS was perceived as enabling. An enabling PMS that has the 
four features (repair, internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility) supported the 
manager’s need for autonomy, competence and relatedness. This support of these three basic 
psychological needs led to internalization of the controlled motivation and enhanced the level of 
autonomous motivation. Consequently, a rise in autonomous motivation is more likely than an 
increase of controlled motivation. Remarkable, but not the core of this research was that the findings 
in the second study indicated that controlled motivation was unrelated (or might even be negatively 
related) to managerial performance. This is in contrast with prior research which indicates that 
controlled motivation creates high involvement in an activity (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, too little variables were taken into consideration to preclude the existence of 
confounding factors that might be at work in this relationship. Further research to unravel this 
relationship is necessary, which was beyond the scope of this dissertation. Some other avenues for 
future research and the limitations of this dissertation are noteworthy and are discussed next.  
 
2. LIMITATIONS  
 
This dissertation had some methodological and contextual limitations. First, this research was set up 
in real life situations. Although this offered the opportunity to do research without having to create 
hypothetical situations that would be perceived as valid when filled out by managers, the 
disadvantage of this method is that it was hard to control for all factors that might influence the 
dependent variable. To meet this shortcoming, consequently rule out confounding variables, control 
variables often cited in the literature as potential factors to influence the relationship were 
integrated in the analyses.  
 
Second, studies 2 and 3 used self-reported measures to measure the degree to which the PMS was 
perceived as enabling, the degree of perceived fairness concerning the individual monetary rewards, 
motivation, effort and managerial performance. To capture the managerial performance and effort, a 
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more objective measure should have been in place. Nevertheless, as a large sample of managers 
from a wide range of organizations was wanted, it was impossible to get indication on the 
organizational performance or the managers’ performance by also questioning the manager’s direct 
supervisor. The promise for anonymity did not allow for getting this information. Moreover, it was 
believed that if the respondents knew that supervisors would also give indications on their levels of 
effort and performance, they would have been less willing to participate in the survey and answer 
honestly to the posed questions and statements. In addition, previous research indicated that 
managers are the best judges of their own performance (Hall, 2011; Mills, 2011). Although an 
enabling PMS and fairness of the individual monetary reward were self-reported measures, this is 
not considered a shortcoming but a strength of this research. The first study gave indications that 
although organizations set up the development and use of a PMS to be enabling, it can be perceived 
by the organization’s managers as not very enabling. Consequently, it was very important to measure 
the perception of the manager on the degree to which they perceived the system as enabling rather 
than how the system is set up to be enabling. The same reasoning should be used by evaluating the 
degree of fairness of the individual monetary reward.  
 
Third, getting more insights into the conditions that determine whether the PMS will be perceived as 
enabling called for in-depth research through interviews. Therefore, the first study made use of case 
study research in which there was control for multiple variables while digging into the possible 
underlying factors by conducting semi-structured interviews. However, using this method made 
generalizations difficult. As a result, the results should be interpreted with care. 
 
3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The major opportunity for future research is related to the motivation. Although the self-
determination theory (SDT) distinguishes two major categories of motivation, this dissertation mainly 
focuses on autonomous motivation. The reason for this focus came from the literature which 
indicated that the autonomous motivation is more powerful than the controlled motivation 
(Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010; Wong-On-Wing, Guo, & Lui, 2010). Although previous 
literature indicated that the controlled motivation also resulted in high involvement in an activity 
(Vansteenkiste et al., 2010), preliminary research in this dissertation on controlled motivation 
discovered no significant relation or even a slightly negative relation between controlled motivation 
and managerial performance. Consequently, further research to investigate whether there might be 
confounding variables influencing these relationships is necessary. Three different roads can be 
followed to search for underlying drivers to resolve the equivocal findings.  
133 
 
The first road deals with the overall importance of controlled motivation in middle and top 
management functions. The studies in this dissertation indicated that middle and top managers have 
a high level of autonomous motivation. A recent study by Van den Broeck et al. (2013) indicates that 
when autonomous motivation is already high, controlled motivation is less likely to have an effect on 
managerial outcomes (Van den Broeck, Lens, De Witte, & Van Coillie, 2013). This may have caused 
the small significance of the controlled motivation in the studies. Nevertheless, the studies in this 
dissertation have too little data to confirm this line of reasoning. Therefore, a call for research to 
investigate the motivation profiles for the middle and top management population is in order. A 
previous study on a representative sample of the Belgian work force revealed that four different 
motivational profiles exist (Van den Broeck et al., 2013). Group one has a high level of autonomous 
motivation combined with a high level of controlled motivation, group two has a high level of 
autonomous motivation and a low level of controlled motivation, group three has a low level of 
autonomous motivation combined with a high level of controlled motivation, and group four has a 
low level of autonomous motivation combined with a low level of controlled motivation. The results 
of the studies in this dissertation indicated that the groups with a low level of autonomous 
motivation might be non-existent for middle and top management profiles. The search for the 
motivation profiles should be combined with research on the role of the managers’ superiors to 
influence their motivation profile. Previous research indicated that the subordinates of superiors that 
have an autonomy supportive managerial style show more autonomous motivation (Hardré & Reeve, 
2009). It would be interesting to investigate whether this finding also holds for middle and top 
managers, as this might influence the motivation profiles.  
 
Second, this dissertation did not focus on the effect of rewards on the controlled motivation, 
because the autonomous motivation was revealed most influential to affect performance. Although 
controlled motivation has been associated with inconsistent goal striving, impaired performance and 
persistence (Gagné & Forest, 2008), it can result in high involvement in an activity (Vansteenkiste et 
al., 2010). In addition, the use of extrinsic rewards can induce controlled motivation (Gagne & Deci, 
2005) in some situations. The integration of the relationship between rewards and controlled 
motivation with the information on motivation profiles of top and middle managers can improve the 
knowledge on the effect of monetary rewards on managerial behaviour.  
 
The third road for future research is not related to the level of controlled motivation, however will 
further investigate the autonomous motivation. In this dissertation the contribution of the individual 
monetary rewards in a PMS context on the level of autonomous motivation is investigated. 
Nevertheless, group rewards might also have a significant impact on the autonomous motivation. 
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This is due to the power of group rewards to enhance the feeling of relatedness, which will augment 
autonomous motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Therefore, a study that investigates the effect of group 
rewards on the autonomous motivation is necessary. As this dissertation already revealed that many 
middle and top managers have a high degree of autonomous motivation, action research will be the 
most appropriate technique for the proposed research avenue. More specifically, an experimental 
study in one or several organizations in which group rewards are introduced for part of the 
organization should be conducted. A pre-test and post-test that measure the autonomous 
motivation should give more insights into how implementing group rewards alters the level of 
autonomous motivation.   
 
Despite the possible pitfalls of this research and the potential roads for future research, this 
dissertation contributes to both literature and practice. The contributions are described in the next 
section.  
  
4. ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it adds to the existing literature by 
answering the call to further investigate the conditions under which a developmental PMS approach 
is effective (Wouters, 2009). This research stresses the importance of true participation during the 
development process. Moreover, it warns of the difference between the degree to which the PMS is 
developed to be enabling and the degree to which the PMS is perceived as enabling. This research 
also responds to the call to investigate the linkages between business PMSs and reward practices 
(Franco-Santos & Bourne, 2005).  Moreover, this research also lifts a corner of the veil on the power 
of rewards. It adds to the ongoing discussion of the possible detrimental effects of individual 
monetary rewards on autonomous motivation. It did find a detrimental effect of individual monetary 
rewards on autonomous motivation; however the findings were more nuanced than previously 
found (e.g.; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Kohn, 1993; Sliwka, 2007). The third study pointed out that the 
degree to which the PMS is perceived as enabling will determine the motivational power of rewards. 
When the PMS is perceived as highly enabling, the manager’s level of autonomous motivation will be 
higher. When the PMS is perceived minimally enabling, the detrimental effect of monetary rewards 
exists when the bonus is perceived as not fair. On the contrary, when the manager perceives the 
PMS as highly enabling, the use of a fair individual monetary reward does not add much to the 
manager’s level of autonomous motivation.  
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Second, an operationalization of the concept enabling PMS was executed. Previous literature in a 
management control context investigated the concept of enabling formalization in an exploratory 
context using longitudinal studies or interviews (e.g.; Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Cools, Emmanuel, & 
Jorissen, 2008; Free, 2007; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). However, both literature and practice could 
benefit from more quantitative research to further investigate the concept of an enabling PMS. 
Therefore, survey research or experimental research was necessary. A scale to measure enabling 
PMS is needed to conduct survey research. The development of a scale was addressed by only a few 
studies, focusing only on a part of the management control systems (budget and work teams) 
(Chapman & Kihn, 2009; González-Romá, Fortes Ferreira, & Peiró, 2009; Hartmann & Maas, 2011). 
This research contributed to the literature by developing a scale that measures the degree to which a 
PMS is perceived as enabling.  
 
Third, this research delivered additional evidence that strengthens that the autonomous motivation 
is more powerful than the controlled motivation. The second study indicated a more powerful 
relationship between autonomous motivation and managerial performance, than between 
controlled motivation and managerial performance, which seems to be statistically insignificant (or 
might even be marginally negatively significant). Consequently, the results of this research add to 
previous findings indicating that autonomous motivation is more powerful to increase performance 
(Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010; Wong-On-Wing et al., 2010) than controlled 
motivation.  
 
5.  PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Besides the implications for the literature, this dissertation also has practical implications. Within the 
context of PMSs, both success stories as well as failures have been raised in practice. Therefore, 
more information about the drivers and mechanisms is required. This research gave evidence about 
the differences in behavioral outcomes of managers dependent upon how the PMS is used.  
First, when an organization plans to develop and use a PMS, the findings of this research point 
toward the importance of creating an enabling PMS. The higher perception of the PMS as being 
enabling, the higher the level of autonomous motivation and subsequently managerial performance. 
Consequently, the organization can make from the implementation of its PMS a success story by 
creating a PMS that is perceived as highly enabling.  
 
Second, to enhance the possibility of the PMS to be perceived as highly enabling, the organization 
benefits from taken into consideration the participation when the PMS is developed. When 
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managers do not feel the need to participate in the development process, not letting them 
participate does not influence their perception on the PMS as enabling. Therefore it is not necessary 
to let managers participate in the development process to get a PMS that is perceived as enabling. 
However, when participation is offered to middle managers, these managers should have true 
participation in order to perceive the PMS as enabling. When managers are offered participation, but 
they feel that nothing is done with their remarks and recommendations, the PMS will not be 
perceived as enabling. As only about 60 percent of the companies in Belgium use a PMS, this is 
relevant information for the other 40 percent if they plan to introduce a PMS. Making sure that the 
PMS has all the necessary features to be enabling is not enough by itself to create an enabling PMS.  
 
The third contribution this research makes to practice is the indications for the use of individual 
monetary rewards when a PMS is in use. Both the necessity of monetary rewards to create 
performance and the detrimental effect of monetary rewards on managerial behavior have been 
proven. This led to organizations being clueless of whether it is interesting to implement monetary 
rewards in the organization and if so, when and how these rewards should be used. The results of 
this research indicate that organizations should look at their PMS and the manager’s perception on 
the PMS when considering monetary rewards. When the PMS is perceived as highly enabling, 
monetary rewards cannot contribute to further enhance autonomous motivation. When on the 
contrary the PMS is perceived as minimally enabling, organizations can benefit from using individual 
monetary rewards if the bonus has a high level of perceived fairness. When the perceived fairness on 
the monetary reward is low, this will result in a low level of autonomous motivation. 
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